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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF FRONTLINE LEADERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING:
EVIDENCE FROM INCREMENTAL BUSINESS PROCESS IMPROVEMENT
BY
ISABELLE NATHALIE MONLOUIS
2013
Committee Chair: Dr Daniel Robey, PhD
Major Academic Unit: Business Administration

What is the role of frontline project leadership in organizational learning in incremental business
process improvement (iBPI)? Current literature is sparse on the topic of contributions to
organizational learning made by frontline employees leading iBPI projects. To bridge this gap,
we use an embedded longitudinal multiple case to study the process of leadership of four
frontline iBPI projects. The 4I model (intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing)
of organizational learning serves as a theoretical lens to study how the insights originating from
frontline employees unfold through group-level integration and organization-level
institutionalization.
Mapping the flow of key project events to the relevant social and psychological processes
of the 4I model, we identify how organizational learning unfolds within and through the three
levels of the model. The granularity of the 4I model creates a valuable foundation for informing
the role of frontline project leadership in iBPI programs and the capacity to leverage insights
originating from frontline employees into organizational learning. Practitioners and engaged
xi

scholars will find this level of granularity helpful for program design, evaluation, and learning
interventions.

xii

INTRODUCTION
I.I Research Domain
Six Sigma was developed in the 1980’s and promoted by Motorola as a business
management strategy to improve quality, reduce costs, increase employee engagement, and
position a company to exceed customer expectations. Use of Six Sigma for organizational
effectiveness expanded dramatically when General Electric (GE) endorsed Six Sigma as a
strategy to drive business transformation and sustain competitive advantage. Through process reengineering, leadership development, and organizational learning as its main drivers, GE
reported $2 billion in savings (GE 1999 annual report). By 2007, 50% of Fortune 500 companies
and 82% of Fortune 100 companies had adopted a version of Six Sigma (Marx, 2007), yet they
reported mixed results.
In August 2009, CPG North America, a subsidiary of a consumer goods Fortune 500
company, launched its Six Sigma program to decrease costs and position itself for strategic
growth. Increases in productivity were necessary to generate the cash flow required to finance a
$20-billion acquisition and to invest in growing sales of their market-dominant brands. With a
company split between a high-growth, multi-billion-dollar business and a high-margin, multibillion-dollar business needed to fuel the growth, the demand for sustained performance grew
higher.
With these high stakes, the focus of Six Sigma practice at CPG has been on strategy,
technical toolkit, selection, and development of full-time Black Belts and Master Black Belts,
“heavyweight project leaders” (Schroeder et al., 2008) who implement large Six Sigma projects.
They provide proof of concept and early financial results necessary to rally program support.
1
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However, focus on full-time project leaders alone may not be sufficient to deliver on the
promises of the Six Sigma program as a sustainable engine of organizational effectiveness and
cultural change. Less is understood about Green Belt program deployments. While Black Belts
and Master Black Belts typically represent less than 1% of the workforce, Green Belts who are
part-time project leaders typically represent 10% to 50% of the employee base, providing critical
leverage. As embedded resources, Green Belts provide cultural leverage through their numbers
and their existing networks of relationships.
My interest in this domain grew out of experiences working as a consultant for CPG
North America, which was undertaking a Lean Six Sigma initiative to train and deploy frontline
employees so they could become certified as Green Belts. As I worked with the candidates, I
became aware of some dynamics that inspired me to consider the initiative as a case study of
organizational learning.
Understanding the Lean Six Sigma Green Belt program in the context of organizational
learning is important. As executive sponsors of the program seek to reap the cost and
productivity savings of the program, they will be interested in the process by which these savings
are generated, especially if that process impacts the quality and sustainability of the solutions and
the ability of the organization to capture the knowledge acquired by individuals and teams during
the process improvement process and to leverage it for future use.
I.II Theoretical Background
I.II.i Defining Six Sigma. Schroeder et al. (2008: 540) define Six Sigma as a process
improvement program, distinct from previous business transformation or quality initiatives. “We
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propose the following rigorous base definition that captures the theoretical aspects of Six Sigma
from the case study data and literature: Six Sigma is an organized, parallel-meso structure to
reduce variation in organizational processes by using improvement specialists, a structured
method, and performance metrics with the aim of achieving strategic objectives.”
The Six Sigma methodology used for projects aimed at improving an existing business
process is known as DMAIC, for its five phases:


Define: Define the problem, customer expectations, and the project goals.



Measure: Measure key aspects of the process and collect relevant data.



Analyze: Analyze the data to investigate and verify cause-and-effect relationships for the
defect(s) under investigation and determine the root cause(s).



Improve: Improve the process based upon data analysis and run pilot tests to establish
process capability.



Control: Control the improved process by implementing systems to continuously monitor
the process.
Table 1 shows the main activities for the phases. Each of the DMAIC phases ends with a

tollgate review, at which time the deliverables for that phase are due and must be approved.
These deliverables are also shown in Table 1.

4

Table 1: Common DMAIC Phase Deliverables
Define

Establish Team Charter
Identify Sponsor and Team Resources
Administer Pre-Work

Measure

Confirm Team Goal
Define Current State
Collect and Display Data

Analyze

Determine Process Capability and Speed
Determine Sources of Variation and Time
Bottlenecks

Improve

Generate Ideas
Conduct Experiments
Create Straw Models
Conduct B’s and C’s
Develop Action Plans
Implement

Control

Develop Control Plan
Monitor Performance
Mistake-Proof Process

Project Charter or Statement of Work
 Process and Problem
 Scope and Boundaries
 Team, Customers, and Critical Concerns
 Improvement Goals and Objectives
 Estimate Sigma and Cost of Poor Quality
Gantt Chart / Timeline
High Level Process Map
Step Documentation and Next Steps
Exit Review
Baseline Figures (Sigma and Cost)
Process Capability
Measurement System Analysis or Gage R&R
Reﬁne Project Charter, including Cost of Poor Quality
Reﬁne Process Map
Fix Gantt Chart / Timeline
SIPOC or IPO Diagram
Step Documentation and Next Steps
Exit Review
Identified Root Cause(s)
 Cause and Effect
 Statistical Analyses
Validated Root Cause(s)
Step Documentation and Next Steps
Exit Review
Selected Root Cause(s) and Countermeasures
Improvement Implementation Plan
Validated Solutions or Improvements
 Statistical Analyses
Revised Flowchart or Process Map
Step Documentation and Next Steps
Exit Review
Control Plan Control
 Tolerances, Controls, and Measures
 Charts and Monitor
 Standard Operating Procedures
Response Plan
 Ownership or Responsibilities
 Corrective Actions
Validated in-Control Process and Benefits
 Process Capability
 Measurement System Analysis or Gage R&R
Step Documentation and Final Report
Exit Review
Project Completion and Handoff to Owner

(adapted from George, 2002, p. 26, Table 2-1. Lean Six Sigma Tool Set, and Goffnett, 2004, p. 6, Table 1-1. Six Sigma Strategic
Methodology, Section Deliverables, and Traditional Tools)
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Schroeder et al. (2008) further distinguish Six Sigma as a process improvement program
leveraging a team of mostly full-time improvement specialists called Black Belts. “Typically,
these specialists were trained in the Six Sigma structured method through 4 weeks of training
with hands-on experience in improving one or more processes” (p. 541). According to this
definition, the full-time focus is one of the key distinctions of Six Sigma from past practice,
when “organizations were reluctant to make the investment in full-time specialists and often
assigned improvement tasks to already overworked staff on a part-time basis” (p. 548) In
practice, many organizations also provide training in Six Sigma basics to most, if not all,
employees assigned to projects. The employees who devote part of their work time to leading
improvement projects receive two weeks of training and are called Green Belts. The Green Belt
Six Sigma training and development program includes training, coaching, practice, and
documentation components that are intended to stimulate both single- and double-loop learning,
as the Green Belts are trained to uncover and challenge existing assumptions.
This “parallel-meso structure” of the Lean Six Sigma Green Belt program offers a unique
opportunity to explore the dynamics of organizational learning and its contribution to
organizational effectiveness. The structured Lean Six Sigma training and project execution
method are “inherently a knowledge creation activity” (Choo et al., 2007). Also, the Lean Six
Sigma program requirements encourage a systematic documentation of project results,
maintenance of process changes, and quantification of the organizational impact of the projects.
These documentation requirements become part of organizational memory and provide a
traceable chain of feed-forward processes and feedback processes (Crossan et al., 1999).
Following Green Belt projects as they unfolded over a 12- to 28-month period, allowed us to
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collect rich data throughout the intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing
processes composing organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999).
I.II.ii Organizational learning and Six Sigma. Robey et al. (1995) propose that
business process reengineering programs such as Lean Six Sigma are best considered within the
context of organizational learning and that the complementarity of their relative strengths and
weaknesses gives the combined metaphor of “business process learning” greater capacity for
organizational effectiveness. Specifically, Six Sigma is a business process re-engineering
program that has been positively linked to the organizational learning process. Six Sigma aims to
result in greater knowledge, but also in the type of dramatic strategic organizational change and
transformation of capabilities that provide the company with the means to achieve organizational
ambidexterity of efficiency and adaptability (Schroeder et al., 2008). Despite these ambitious
objectives, other studies find that Six Sigma deployments fall short of expectations.
Fewer than 2% of peer-reviewed academic papers on Six Sigma have looked at the link
with organizational learning in an effort to explain this discrepancy, and fewer still from the
perspective of the Green Belt leaders (Aboelmaged, 2010). Bourg et al.’s (2008) study on Green
Belt program effectiveness highlights the discrepancy between the investments in training and
the limited organizational returns. Referring to Argyris and Schön’s (1978) distinction between
learning that simply fixes the problem (single-loop learning) and learning that questions the
values, assumptions, and corporate policies that led to the problem (double-loop learning),
Savolainen (2007) defines learning from most Six Sigma implementations as single-loop
learning and recommends further research to investigate if and how Six Sigma learning develops
into sustainable capabilities and organizational learning.
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I.II.iii Green Belt project leadership focus

Table 2: Structural Control and Exploration in Six Sigma

(reprinted from Schroeder et al., 2008)

In the case of Lean Six Sigma, knowledge creation and institutionalization must be
actively and purposefully managed for organizational learning to occur (Choo et al., 2007). High
expectations of financial returns have prompted corporate leaders to invest heavily in Lean Six
Sigma and the training provided to Green Belts. The formal methodology promises to create and
institutionalize knowledge through active and purposeful management (Choo et al., 2007).
However, returns remain elusive (Bourg et al., 2010). The mixed results experienced in
deploying the Lean Six Sigma method with Green Belts and Black Belts may be attributed to a
failure to appreciate the distinct challenges faced by frontline employees who are recruited into
Green Belt training. Although the deployment strategy used for Green Belt training is an
extension of the strategy used for full-time project leaders (Black Belts), Green Belts operate
under dramatically different resource constraints and target much smaller business opportunities.
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I.III Research Perspective
This longitudinal case study sought to understand how the leadership process of Green
Belt projects in the CPG Canada Six Sigma Green Belt program, contributed to organizational
learning. To study the role of frontline employees in organizational learning, we looked at four
Green Belt projects embedded in the same business process improvement program, through the
conceptual lens of the 4I model of organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999). By bridging
individual intuition, group interpretation and integration, and organizational institutionalization,
the 4I model provided a framework for analyzing how employees contribute to organizational
learning, including the social and psychological processes necessary for successful dissemination
and exploitation of knowledge.
I.III.i Engaged scholarship. As mentioned earlier, this research originated from a
request by CPG International (a fictitious name) headquarters for me, as a consultant, to design a
targeted learning intervention for the deployment of its global Lean Six Sigma Green Belt
program for frontline employees. This relationship allowed generous access to CPG’s facilities,
data, and key informants. The relevance of the topic to current business concern and the
established trust in the work relationship produced very candid conversations. I was on site
approximately one week per month during the first 18 months, which corresponded to the
consulting request. Through this engagement, it became clear that each of CPG’s 48 North
American locations faced similar problems and the consulting relationship later culminated in a
more focused, research-only engagement with a specific plant in Canada. Over the next 10
months, I spent 12 weeks on site with a core group of key informants, engaging stakeholders at
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multiple levels of the organization in gathering and analyzing data. The ongoing nature of the
relationship allowed me to observe the deployment as it unfolded over those 28 months.
I.III.ii. Research setting. The research site is a large manufacturing plant representative
of CPG’s North American product mix and diversity of operations. At the behest of CPG
headquarters, the plant leadership team launched the business transformation program in
successive waves, first training the leadership team members and then full-time project leaders.
Compelling initial results prompted an acceleration of the program and the extension of the
program to frontline employees.
The results of the frontline portion of the program were very disappointing, prompting
the leadership team to question the effectiveness of the business transformation program and the
value of including the frontline employees in the transformation efforts. Fewer than 9% of
participating frontline employees completed their projects and earned skill certification. Project
cycle times extended far beyond expected timelines. Project results were hard to quantify. Few
project leaders cared to continue past their initial engagement. As one of the program managers
told us, completed projects rarely yielded sustainable improvements. Project leaders reported
experiencing and solving the same problems over and over within and across the plants. These
results, which are representative of results reported in the literature (Bourg et al., 2010), were
consistent across all 48 of CPG’s North American sites.
I.III.iii Research opportunity. Grounded in the opportunity to learn from the high
failure rate, the earlier consulting intervention addressed the urgent business needs. On the other
hand, our research study focused on the leadership processes of four Green Belt projects, deemed
successful enough to warrant Green Belt certification. An organizational learning lens reveals
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dramatic differences between the leadership processes from one project to the other and equally
dramatic differences between the short-term and long-term benefits. This experience motivated
our study of the Lean Six Sigma Green Belt program at CPG to understand the role of frontline
leadership in organizational learning in incremental business process improvement.
To investigate the contribution of frontline employees to organizational learning, we
conducted an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of the knowledge transactions to and from
frontline employees, using the 4I model of organizational learning as a theoretical frame against
the background of a large business transformation initiative. We sought to answer the following
question:
What is the role of frontline leadership in organizational learning in incremental business
process improvement?
I.IV Research Approach
To explore the role of the frontline leadership, we investigated how and under which
conditions frontline employees contribute to organizational learning. Using an embedded
longitudinal multiple-case-study approach, we worked in close collaboration with key
stakeholders at multiple levels of the organization to identify cases, and collect archival and new
data. With the frontline employees as the focus of our study, we analyzed the Green Belt
training and Green Belt improvement project activities through the conceptual lens of the 4I
model of organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999).
The case study method has been proven effective in researching complex social
phenomena including “individual life cycles, small group behavior, [and] organizational and
managerial processes” (Yin, 2009, page 4). The embedded multiple-case-study design reflects a
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deliberate strategy of using replication logic to surface conditions that impact the occurrence and
effectiveness of the contributions originating from frontline employees.
While the case-study method allowed us to capture the complexity and fluid nature of the
context within which the events happen, the engaged scholarship model of close collaboration
provided rich insights into the design, data collection, and analysis of the cases (Van de Ven,
2007). The ongoing access to the research setting and research participants provided a timeline
of key events and event sequences that formed the foundation of the process model of the 4I and
yielded the contributions in Table 3.
Table 3: Framing of This Research
Component
Problem Situation

Literature
Organizational
Learning in iBPI

Contribution
Identify key enablers and barriers to
Organizational Learning in iBPI

Area of Concern

Organizational
Learning
4I Model of
Organizational
Learning

Develop our understanding of the role of
frontline leadership in organizational learning
Defining the leadership role of the project leader
and gate keepers in organizational learning.
Unpacking micro-processes through which the
4I processes unfold within and through the
individual, group, and organizational levels in
the iBPI frontline leadership process.

Theoretical Framing

I.V Summary of Dissertation
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation provide supportive arguments for this
research as follows:


Chapter 2 reviews theoretical and empirical contributions to the 4I framework of
organizational learning. It lays the foundation for the research into the process by which
frontline employees contribute to organizational learning.
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Chapter 3 describes the research setting, the overall research design, and the approach to
data collection and data analysis. This chapter also presents the application of an
embedded multiple-case-study approach and collaborative practice research to build a
process model. The key events and event sequences explain the outcomes of the
organizational learning process.



Chapter 4 discusses case by case results.



Chapter 5 explores the cross-case analysis contributions to the theoretical framework of
the 4I model and to the practice of organizational learning in iBPI.



Chapter 6 concludes with implications for practitioners of organizational learning and
practitioners of iBPI, limitations of the study and suggestions for future research.

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
In this chapter, I review the key developments in the literature on the 4I model of
organizational learning. I also describe the Lean Six Sigma approach to process improvement,
which is considered as a component of the broader organizational learning process.
II.I Organizational Learning
Organizational learning, which Fiol and Lyles (1985) define as “the process of improving
actions through better knowledge and understanding,” has attracted attention over the past half
century. However, theorists and practitioners are not in agreement on what “organizational
learning” means or how it works, beyond the basic point that organizational learning is a
dynamic process. Among models of organizational learning, Crossan et al. (1999) has proven to
be the most comprehensive, and most cited (Crossan et al., 2011), while also capturing the multilevel processes of organizational learning. Crossan et al. (1999) distinguish organizational
learning from knowledge management or other related disciplines by defining its objectives.
“Organizational learning can be conceived of as a principal means of achieving the strategic
renewal of an enterprise” (p. 522). They note, “Renewal requires that organizations explore and
learn new ways while concurrently exploiting what they have already learned,” citing the
organizational tension between exploration and exploitation introduced by March (1991).

13
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II.II 4I Model of Organizational Learning
Figure 1: 4I Framework of Organizational Learning (Crossan et al., 1999)
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In introducing their 4I framework for organizational learning, Crossan et al. (1999)
unified many of the existing perspectives of organizational learning by proposing a multi-level
framework. Within the 4I model, four integrated social and psychological processes leverage the
cognition-action and action-cognition links to manage the tension between exploration and
exploitation of knowledge. Crossan et al. present the basics of their model through four
theoretical premises.
Premise 1 introduces strategic renewal as the endogenous variable of interest in
organizational learning. Using strategic renewal as a lens for organizational learning is important
because it requires the model to address the challenge of managing both continuity and change at
the level of the enterprise (Hurst 1995), tension between assimilating new learning (exploration)
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and using what has been learned (exploitation). In the context of the 4I model, this process of
harmonization is operationalized through the feed-forward and the feedback learning flows. Feed
forward occurs as new insights and new learning move up to the organization level, while
feedback consists of the exploitation of that knowledge at the different levels of the organization.
In this way, organizational learning processes and outcomes are linked to the organizational
requirement of purposeful allocation of scarce resources required to achieve survival and
prosperity goals (March 1991). The scarcity of resources creates a competition between feedforward and feedback and contributes to the dynamic nature of the 4I model.
Premise 2 is that organizational learning is a multilevel phenomenon that spans
individual, group, and organization levels. The 4I model details the importance of all three levels
in the development of the feed-forward learning flow and illustrates how both groups and
individuals are influenced by institutionalized knowledge through the feedback learning flow.
Premise 3 explicitly links the three levels by four social and psychological processes.
Intuiting refers to the cognitive process by which an individual will discern something
new, which results from pattern recognition from past knowledge or results from a more
innovative exploration, which can be shown to be effective only after the insight has been
generated and then put to the test. This dynamic replicates the tension between the exploitation
by the expert and exploration by the entrepreneur at the level of the individual (Crossan et al.,
1999). Since the tension between exploration and exploitation can be shown to originate with the
initial insight and its subsequent outcomes, intuiting is a critical step.
Interpreting occurs as the insights are shared and explained, moving beyond the
individual to the group, so a shared understanding can be developed. According to Crossan et al.
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(1999), language and dialogue are critical to this stage, in which the insight moves from the
subconscious to an explicit opportunity ripe for shared action.
Integrating is the stage of the feed-forward process in which coherent and collective
action can occur. Grounded in the shared interpretation, integration continues the process of
dialogue so that mutual agreement about significance or related actions can occur. The initial
idea may continue to morph, as it is now the product of many conversations and the complexities
of practice.
The last process of learning in the 4I model is institutionalizing. Beyond practice, which
may be very dependent upon the group, institutionalizing addresses the level at which learning is
embedded in the organization. Institutionalizing allows organizations to embed—in information
systems and infrastructures, routines, and standard operating procedures—practices that can be
leveraged beyond the initial individual or team of people from whom the insight originated.
Once institutionalized, this knowledge fuels the tension that exists between learning new ways
and using what has already been learned.
In this way, the institutionalization process informs and constrains new learning
processes as part of the feedback loop that links the institutional level to the group level and the
individual level. In enabling individuals and groups to exploit what has been learned, the
institutionalization process contributes to the cognition, actions, and future intuiting by
individuals in the organization.
While the literature is more concerned with how the four processes work in the feedforward flow, Crossan et al. (1999) contend that these four processes “are the glue that holds the
model together” through both feed forward and feedback.
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Premise 4 states that cognition affects action and vice versa. By offering a comprehensive
framework including the dynamics of generation, assimilation, and utilization of knowledge, the
4I model illustrates the importance of knowledge in informing the actions that result in
organizational success and how these actions in turn generate new knowledge that can be
leveraged for strategic action.
A multilevel view of organizational learning, the 4I model (Figure 1) spans the
individual, group, and organizational levels through its four feed-forward processes—intuiting,
interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing—and its feedback processes to illustrate how
scarce resources can be managed over time, to generate and utilize knowledge to achieve
organizational strategic objectives.
II.III 4I Model in the Literature
Since the publication of Crossan et al.’s seminal article in 1999, over 1700 academic
articles have cited the 4I model. The diversity of domains in which it has been used underscores
its ability to explain the concept of organizational learning and its relevance to strategic
organizational objectives. However, fewer than half of these articles use the model substantially
(Crossan, 2011) and only nine apply it fully (Hansen, 2012). For example, Berends and Lammers
(2010) contribute to the understanding of the 4I model by using a process model to examine the
impact of process discontinuities. They make the case that social processes and the temporal
nature of organizational learning impact the sustainability of organizational learning in key ways,
but they fail to address the strategic focus of the first premise.
Though the completeness of the model contributes to its strength, few studies have
explored its strategic focus, two learning flows, three units of analysis, four social and
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psychological processes, and its emphasis on the action cognition link. Using the four premises
as a lens for full utilization of the model reveals an even split between published theoretical and
empirical scholarly articles.
II.III.i Theoretical studies. Theoretical studies of the 4I model have contributed to its
development by integrating the 4I with related constructs and extended our understanding of its
applicability across different lenses. For example, Vera and Crossan (2004) build on the 1999
article to explore how the leadership styles of the CEO or senior leaders impact the stocks of
flow of knowledge. They make a compelling argument that both transformational leadership and
transactional leadership contribute to organizational learning. They argue that managing
organizational learning requires senior leaders to have a combined leadership style. Specifically,
that transformational leadership is best suited to feed forward learning, because of its efficacy at
managing change. On the other hand, transactional leadership might be better suited at managing
feedback and its emphasis on institutionalization, reinforcement, and refinement of existing
knowledge.
Mazutis and Slawinski (2008) also extended our understanding of the role of top
managers in enabling organizational learning. Using the 4I model as a theoretical lens, they
explore the organizational learning impact of leaders exercising authentic leadership. By creating
an organizational culture of dialogue, they support feedback and the feed-forward learning flows,
promoting and reinforcing double-loop learning.
In contrast to an organizational culture of authentic dialogue, Lawrence et al. (2005)
integrated the dynamics of power and politics into the socio-psychological dynamics of the 4I
model. They position power and politics as the social energy that fuels the feed-forward and
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feedback processes and explain why some insights become institutionalized whereas some do
not. Like the temporal effects contributed by Berends and Lammer, the politics of organizational
learning explain discontinuities at a more granular level, which explains the fragmentation and
transience observed in organizational learning. Furthermore, Lawrence et al. (2005) argue that,
because specific forms of power are more effective at producing certain learning outcomes, these
forms of power that might be exercised by a variety of tactics are connected to specific learning
processes. They propose that intuition is linked with the discipline of being exposed to streams of
experience that shape the identities of individuals and facilitates expert pattern recognition.
Interpretation is linked with influence and the ability to affect the perception of the cost-benefits
associated with a new idea. Integration is linked with force and the ability to impose a decision
and to remove opposition. While force is considered an episodic use of power,
institutionalization is linked with domination and the ability to systemically restrict available
behaviors to overcome the resistance to change of organizational members.
Finally, while Sun and Anderson (2010) recognize the importance of leadership in
playing an integrative role between the two learning flows, their contribution focuses on
integrating organizational learning and absorptive capacity through the 4I processes. They
conclude that the individual and group levels are mostly focused on knowledge acquisition while
assimilation is mostly a group-level activity that is constrained by the interaction of team
member characteristics and environmental factors that can either encourage or discourage the
verbalization and articulation of frame-breaking insights. Transformation is aligned with both
group and organizational levels through the socio-psychological and practical testing of new
understanding. Sun and Anderson conclude with the alignment of the exploitation aspects of
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absorptive capacity with the organizational level through its ability to leverage rewards and
recognition programs and restructure organizational memory.
Each one of these studies takes a fine-grained look at the processes of organizational
learning across the three levels and provides rich details about how the additional lenses of
senior leadership, political power, or absorptive capacity extend the 4I model. However, they do
so without the benefit of empirical validation.
II.III.ii Empirical studies. In contrast, the following studies have focused on
contributing empirical validations of the 4I model. Using a case study approach, Crossan and
Berdrow (2003) illustrate the phenomenon of strategic renewal through the four processes and
three levels of the 4I model. The case provides an instructive empirical validation of the first
premise of the 4I model by exploring the unfolding tension between exploration of new
knowledge and exploitation of existing structures and how this tension contributed to the process
of strategic renewal of the Canada Post Corporation (CPC). In addition to providing the first
empirical validation of the full 4I model, this study expands the conceptualization of
organizational learning to include a more deliberate focus on its strategic implications. A
retrospective study of the 10-year metamorphosis of CPC, it encompasses the external and
internal competitive drivers for strategic renewal and the top-down, feed-forward flow of ideas
originating from key individuals such as the CEO. While the CPC bottom-up intuiting and
interpreting activities generated significant productivity savings, they were constrained by stated
goals and generated mostly single-loop learning. Managing the tension between exploration and
exploitation proved so difficult that CPC eventually created an independent business structure to
tackle customer-driven innovations.
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Lunnan and Barth (2003) use a multiple case study approach to explore how this tension
is managed through bridge teams and to what extent the learning generated by the teams is
captured by the organization. Bridge teams are cross-functionally diverse teams working with a
strategic alliance partner, and their work is typically of strategic importance. From comparing the
case studies, the authors concluded that, on the one hand, the team with the narrowest focus
exploited knowledge very efficiently but contributed very little that was new. On the other hand,
teams with different comfort levels for sharing ideas contributed many new ideas to their firms
but found little success in exploiting them. Another key finding stresses the need to balance
formal reports and databases with informal social interactions to elicit both explicit and technical
as well as tacit and relational knowledge exploration. Finally, they conclude, “Even productionoriented teams have opportunities for explorative learning and very innovative-oriented teams
need to worry about exploitation. Both forms of learning are guided by the group and
organizational conditions within which the team operates, including the visibility and proximity
to organizational decision makers” (Lunnan and Barth, 2007).
Stevens and Dimitriadis (2004) used a longitudinal multiple-case study to test the
applicability and the limitations of the 4I model when applied to new service design (NSD).
While they found ample support for the 4I processes and multiple learning loops, they also found
that learning processes alone could not explain all the new service decisions made. Also, they
note that a weakness of the 4I model is its assertion that the building of learning at the individual
and group levels results in organizational learning. In spite of the model’s failure to include
factors that may delay or prevent the feed forward process from unfolding to institutionalization,
Stevens and Dimitriadis conclude that the 4I model extends research on NSD in two ways: by
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extending the management of development projects to include activities that contribute to
institutionalization by embedding knowledge, and by shaping an alternative to the linear,
predefined staged development NSD approaches.
Using a grounded theory approach, Zietsma et al. (2002) examine the factors facilitating
or impeding organizational learning. While they find support for the key 4I processes, they
contribute two additional action-based learning processes—“attending” and “experimenting”—
that address the needs of the firm to adapt beyond exploitation and internal intuiting. They
propose that a firm also needs to attend to external forces, supplementing the intuiting process,
and that groups also experiment to validate and integrate learning. Finally, the authors recognize
the dynamics of both internal and external power and its influence on managing the legitimacy
trap, defined as the tendency of an organization to dismiss challenges to its existing processes
and practices if the source is perceived to be illegitimate. This may trigger further learning
rigidity as organizational actors may instead escalate their commitment to the status quo.
Finally, in a longitudinal study of how IS leaders balance exploration and exploitation in
strategizing, Hansen (2012) found multiple instances of intuiting and extended the 4I model by
proposing that these “waves of insight” can have one individual source, as set forth by the 4I
model, or they can result from multiple sources going through the intuiting process at the same
time. Empirical results from the study showed that institutionalization can drift away from the
defined tasks and plans and take other forms, while endogenous and exogenous events can
interrupt the feed-forward process. Finally, Hansen points out the exploration bias of the 4I
studies, which do not address explicitly how feedback happens through the 4I. She presents

23

empirical evidence that shows that the feedback loop related to a specific feed-forward flow may
not happen until much later.
The seminal article by Crossan et al. (1999) was the most cited article of the decade from
Academy of Management Review. The 4I model that it introduced has been used to illustrate
organizational learning in a variety of domains (Crossan et al., 2009), with a focus on actors with
a measure of organizational power, using a top-down approach to integration,
institutionalization, and feedback. This focus on ideas originating from individuals with power
makes it easier to relate the ideas to the outcomes of strategic renewal and the organizationallevel relationship between exploration and exploitation. Reflecting back on a decade of citations,
Crossan et al. (2011) stress the importance of conceptualizing learning as strategic in that it
encompasses the entire enterprise and to use learning as a “rich theoretical construct to unpack
learning processes” (p. 451). Having established the importance of learning as a dynamic
multilevel phenomenon, they recommend research to further understand how the levels relate to
each other, which makes explicit use of the 4I processes. “We believe there is the potential for
much deeper insight into the 4I processes. Our original article just scratched the surface” (p.
450). Next, they identify the need for research taking an explicit focus on the integration of
power, politics and emotion and the role of leadership in advancing a theory of how
organizational learning unfolds. “In general, there is an opportunity for a better sense of agency
as it relates to organizational learning. In the same way that a theory of organizational learning
needs to anticipate insights from power, politics and emotion, it also needs to account for the role
of leadership (and followership). However, a theory of organizational learning needs to consider
carefully the meaning of leadership. It would be unfortunate if it were viewed solely from an
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upper echelon perspective. Rather, it is evident that individuals can influence at least some of the
learning processes from wherever they reside in organizations and a theory of organizational
learning needs to account for that potential” (pp. 452-453).
Finally, while the 4I model has been widely cited and empirically tested, its relationship
to established methodologies for business process improvement (e.g., BPR, Lean Six Sigma) is
generally overlooked. The question arises, therefore, whether such methodologies are compatible
with the processes specified by the 4I model or not. It is conceivable that a methodology like
Lean Six Sigma, for example, may contribute directly to particular processes of the 4I model
while neglecting others. In this dissertation, we explore the role of leadership in organizational
learning in incremental business process improvement. We explicitly focus on the process of
leadership as we apply the 4I model to study how insights generated by frontline employees are
fed forward to the group and organizational levels and exploited in feedback learning loops.

RESEARCH METHODS
In this chapter, I discuss the research methodology we used to explore the role of the
frontline employee in organizational learning in business process improvement. I begin with a
description of the research setting and follow up with the rationale for a process model and
longitudinal multiple-case-study design. I conclude with a discussion of the collaborative nature
of the research, which enhances the dual focus on theory and practice.
III.I Research Setting
A division of CPG Canada, the Mont-Royal plant manufactures a diverse range of
packaged foods for the Canadian and US markets. With a staff of close to 1000 employees, the
plant is the largest of the 11 CPG Canada plants and the second largest of its 48 North American
counterparts. The study took place between September 2010 and February 2013, with the data
collection occurring in three phases from October 2010 until February 2013. The selection of the
Mont-Royal plant was guided by the desire to minimize the variation of variables not under
study, such as the financial stability of the plant and the maturity of the leadership team, while
maximizing the diversity of potential projects from which to choose. In addition to the diversity
of projects, the plant had received double-digit, year-over-year, corporate productivity
improvement targets at levels that would require nothing short of a complete transformation of
its business processes to achieve and sustain.
In July 2009, the Mont-Royal plant was selected as one of nine North American test sites
for the corporate transformation initiative. For a period of three months, small teams of three to
six experienced consultants were embedded in the organization to lead process improvement
initiatives. The process improvement consultants led “demonstration” projects. Selected after a
25
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plant-wide assessment, these projects were aimed at production problems that would test both the
efficacy and the suitability of the method on the most persistent and widespread production
problems. Deployed full time at the plant, the consultants became familiar figures on the
production line. As experts, they worked in closed cooperation with the plant leader and the
newly appointed continuous improvement managers. As project leaders, they leveraged the
expertise of the frontline employees to understand what they observed, to collect data, and to
implement solutions.
With so much at stake, the teams operated under strong scrutiny from corporate and plant
level leadership. Formal weekly report attended by the consulting practice leaders, corporate,
national, and local leaders became the norm. Successes were celebrated, failures were
acknowledged as evidence of incompetence, and delays or perceived roadblocks were met with
no-holds-barred public ultimatums to produce—or else.
The three-month demonstration paid off. Processes improved. Downtime was reduced
dramatically. Production defects were eliminated. Targeted production lines delivered record
levels of throughput. In a reversal of perceptions, a perceived capacity problem was now
resolved by higher production volume. New production lines or new plants would no longer be
needed to deliver enough output to meet high-season consumer demand. With improvement
projects came more clarity about needed investments. Corporate decision makers rewarded
results with long overdue capital investments.
The pilot quickly evolved into a corporate mandate to implement Lean Six Sigma
company-wide. When the Canadian regional quality director announced the launch of the
program and the improvement targets to his team, several skeptics replied, “When pigs fly.”
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Despite these discreet misgivings, to avoid drawing the attention of program sponsors, training
of internal full-time process improvement project leaders (Black Belts) began in January 2010.
With a charge of duplicating the success of the demonstration projects, the Black Belts
began working alongside the consultants, who remained to supplement the growing team of
internal project leaders. Again, early results continued to be so promising that corporate
headquarters requested an immediate expansion of the program. Plant leadership teams began to
recruit experienced Black Belts. Hoping to capture and leverage expertise, without the high price
tag of external consultants, recruiting expanded to include Certified Master Black Belts.
“Where do you find these people?” At the request of the Senior VP of Quality, the
leadership team of the consulting firm offered their own resources. Embedded consultants
received the first wave of offers, but few accepted. Referrals were made. Building on the trusted
advisor relationship, prospective Master Black Belts interviewed with both internal decision
makers and practice leaders of the consulting firm. Encouraged by the rapid progress and the
better-than-expected results, the corporate team decided to immediately extend the program to
include other employees as part-time project leaders. These Green Belts would keep their fulltime jobs and their job responsibilities would now include leading improvement projects parttime.
The first Green Belt training cohort began in October 2010. A year had elapsed since the
demonstration projects were completed and, in many cases, internal resources were climbing a
steep learning curve. The internally promoted Black Belts were still in training, with a focus on
completing their certification projects. The plant’s leaders were learning to manage the day-today production needs and the very resource-consuming, very visible, and very invasive demands
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of large-scale improvement projects. They allocated their toughest or most costly improvements
initiatives to the consultants, who continued to push forward, being well aware that their per
diem was being weighed against the hard savings generated by their projects. The employees
who had not been directly involved in helping with the initial projects were now asked to take an
active role in leading projects. Corporate guidelines called for 10% of the employees to be
trained as Green Belts and for each of them to complete an improvement project yielding
C$50,000 in annual savings to become certified. After acquiring experience and obtaining
certification, Green Belts were expected to continue to lead up to two improvement projects per
year.
To meet the plant’s 10% deployment objectives, a rolling calendar of training sessions
was established with a new cohort of 15 to 20 Green Belts starting every eight to 12 weeks. Each
cohort attended 10 days of Lean Six Sigma training over a three-month period. Three sessions,
delivered by an external consultant allowed the project leaders to apply their training and move
their own project forward between sessions. The first three days focused on introducing the tools
of the Define and the Measure phases, which project leaders would then apply to their projects
between sessions. The first four to eight hours of the remaining sessions were spent on project
update presentations. The composition of the training class was very diverse, representing the
full diversity of the departments, with some representation from night-shift employees.
Approximately 80% of participants in the first eight cohorts were frontline employees.
The need to manage the tension between a well established, familiar way of doing
business and the external and corporate pressures to fundamentally change business practices and
increase plant organizational effectiveness as a building block of the corporate strategic renewal
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efforts makes this plant setting a very rich environment to study contributions from a frontline
improvement project. Furthermore, this setting encompasses all three levels of the 4I model of
organizational learning. The ability to observe how knowledge is created through the methods of
iBPI and to leverage and to study how this knowledge created by the Green Belt project leaders
develops through the social and psychological processes that link the individual, group, and
organizational levels contributed to make this plant very attractive for our research purposes.
As one of the consultants who led initial plant assessments and demonstration project
teams, I was invited to join CPG or select an assignment of my own choosing. I led the monthly
Green Belt training sessions, which gave me a level of access that went beyond my ability to
speak French, Lean Six Sigma, and manufacturing fluently. I benefited from local support and
corporate sponsorship, I was privy to design decisions made by the consulting firm and strategic
decisions made at levels up to the Senior VP of Quality, and had monthly conversations with
plant leaders. Within a year, I spoke French with a Canadian accent—or so I was told. While all
managers have a very good command of English, which is the corporate language, Quebecois is
the language of the frontline employees. I wore a personalized plant-wide access badge,
mistakenly printed blue (i.e. permanent employee) by the security guard, who began to take my
presence for granted, and rumors began circulating that I might have become an employee. To
balance the access level of an insider and the practiced eye of a subject matter expert, with the
objectivity of a researcher I structured the study in three phases.
III.II Conducting the Study
III.II.i Phase 1: Getting grounded—Trainer/Observer. The first phase of the
engagement was an ethnographic phase from September 2010 until March 2011, when I became
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grounded in the emerging CPG Green Belt program. The CPG plant was one of three North
American plants in which I delivered training sessions monthly. Similar patterns of high project
abandonment rates and Green Belt disenchantment began to emerge among these three plants,
prompting me to validate my early insights with the team of 20 colleagues deployed in a training
capacity across the U.S. and Canada. We all saw the same patterns. Also, the continuous
improvement managers at these plants began to ask for help before the first training session
began. They expressed concerns that, with their full commitment of resources to ongoing
projects led by full-time Black Belt and consultants among other corporate initiatives, they could
not support training and coaching this volume of Green Belt projects and could not deliver on the
six-month expected Green Belt project completion timeline or the target of an average of
C$50,000 in project savings, let alone continue to coach certified project leaders after
certification.
I began to observe and collect data on the Green Belt deployment in order to prepare a
fact-based recommendation that would be grounded in their organizational context. In addition to
conducting the monthly training sessions, facilitating training project update presentations, and
auditing detailed project data, I also had numerous conversations with the Green Belts about
their project experience. Even after their training sessions were completed, I would often meet
with members of earlier cohorts in the cafeteria. I chose to sit at their tables rather than the table
occupied by the plant’s senior and middle managers, which allowed me insight into
conversations among project team members and between project leaders and other frontline
employees not yet involved in Lean Six Sigma projects. I also encouraged members of earlier
cohorts to stop in the training room and meet new cohort members during training days,
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especially after afternoon cookies and drinks were delivered. This occasion proved to be a rich
source of ongoing insights into how the project leadership process stalled or developed from
month to month, which I documented and which became CPG archival data. This first phase of
the project completed with my data-driven assessment that the Green Belt program was not
producing expected results but that a timely learning intervention could reverse the trend.
III.II.ii Phase 2: Preparing for action—Consultant/Researcher. With the support of
the Mont-Royal continuous improvement and plant managers and with the approval of the
consulting firm practice leaders, I contacted the North American Senior VP of Quality, whom I
had met during the demonstration project phase. We met at U.S. headquarters the day of the
public announcement that the Lean Six Sigma deployment had delivered over $450 million of
savings. The Canadian regional quality director was busy hand delivering nine-inch cast iron
desktop flying pigs to all full-time Six Sigma resources, so it was hard for senior leaders to
believe that the Green Belt program could be in difficulty when the balance of the program
worked so well.
He asked me a question that surprised me: “Why are you the one telling me this?” My
candid answer was that I was the one telling him about the difficulties of the Green Belt program
because I was on the frontline able to see them as it was developing—and because I could. As an
external consultant focused on delivering training sessions, I had the freedom from political or
career consequences to look objectively and speak about what worked and what did not. I could
see it happen across the board. It was not a problem tied to a specific project leader or plant. It
was a systemic problem that needed a systemic solution.
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In addition to project status data from the three plants I was working with, I had brought a
copy of the only peer-reviewed published academic article on the Green Belt training and
deployment process (Bourg et al., 2010). The first 12 words of the abstract, “With 300 Green
Belt trained but business results not delivered as targeted…,” made my case that this systemic
problem went beyond CPG and was a well known problem, but not yet well resolved. The
Agilent Technologies case (Bourg et al., 2010) was considered a success after a long, involved
intervention raised certification levels there from zero to 9%.
An engaged research approach to developing a core solution addressing common
problems could be deployed across the 48 North American plants. I left the meeting after
suggesting that the VP of Quality ask his staff to report on the Green Belt program—not on
numbers of Green Belt trained, but on number of projects completed, stable process
improvements, dollars saved, and certified Green Belts. He conferred with his team and then
called me the next day and approved the project. Even though it had been many years since he
had earned his doctorate, he understood the scholarly scope of my request to use the site and the
business transformation context for research and he graciously granted his support.
While we awaited the completion of the formal approval process, we began to contact
internal subject matter experts, with mixed results. When we shared details of the redesign
project, a very experienced, very successful, and extremely well respected internal deployment
thought leader replied, “Green Belt? This is sh*t. We know it’s sh*t. This sh*t does not work.
Everybody knows it. This sh*t is a waste of time. We’re better off hiring Black Belts.”
My intent was to study organizational learning, but the immediate business need was to
design a learning intervention to address the bottleneck of stalled and abandoned Green Belt
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projects while training new cohorts of candidates. While we executed the original data collection
and analysis plan, designing an intervention became the focus of the second phase of the study.
Having established that the experience of the Mont-Royal plant was representative of the
experiences of the other plants, we decided to focus the research project team on a small team of
very motivated local actors.
I returned to the Mont-Royal plant and met with the plant leader to share the news. He
replied, “Please tell me you are not going to use Six Sigma to figure this out!” I spent 12 weeks
on site over a four-month period during which we exploited the data I had collected during the
previous year. We supplemented that data with in-depth, face-to-face interviews with Green Belt
project leaders and project team members. Even though we were well versed in the literature on
iBPI and Lean Six Sigma methods and projects, the interview protocol was developed to build
process models of the actual Green Belt project leadership processes.
We began with a sample of 12 members from the first four cohorts, according to project
results (very successful, average, and unsuccessful) and level of Green Belt project leaders
(frontline and mid-management). Mapping their process histories led us to interview their Black
Belt coaches and occasionally their project champions or a key team member to complete the
picture. We later coded the interview transcripts according to the 4I feed-forward process. We
conducted several meetings with sub-teams representing various stakeholder groups to validate
our findings, identify opportunities, and develop learning interventions together.
As we completed our recommendations, important leadership changes happened at the
corporate and regional levels. The company was preparing to spin off one third of its assets as a
separate business and leadership teams were preparing for a complete reorganization. Access to
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consulting resources was suspended until some strategic decisions were made public. Regarding
our recommendation, the decision was made to implement a part of the intervention focused on a
simplified curriculum for upcoming Green Belt cohorts and to freeze other changes until further
notice.
III.II.iii Phase 3: Organizational learning—100% research. Having met my
commitment to the business to identify the root causes of failure of the program and design a
custom intervention to address these causes within the resource constraints of the plants, I
returned on site as an unpaid researcher to complete the third phase of my engagement with the
Mont-Royal plant, solely focused on researching organizational learning. This stage of the study
benefited from the relationships built during the first two phases.
Project leaders were very generous with their time, even if I seemed to ask the same
questions I had asked a year earlier, even when I should have known the answer to the question
because I was there. I asked them to answer as though I had not been there and they graciously
agreed.
Oliver (the new continuous improvement manager) and I discussed Six Sigma practice
and leadership theories while the Black Belt who had worked with me side by side during the
second phase of the project knew the 4I model well enough to discuss case analysis at the subprocess level and debate case selection. The previous phases of the study had revealed so many
causes of failure that could be attributed either to the Lean Six Sigma deployment process itself
or to the process of leadership that we decided to focus the organizational learning study on the
project leadership process of four frontline leaders who were all considered successful from the
standpoint of the Lean Six Sigma program. As frontline Green Belts who had led successful
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projects, they had already beaten the odds of “the obstacle course,” as many interviewees called
it. Among them, two out of four project leaders had succeeded not only in completing their
projects but also in having the solutions institutionalized at the at the plant level. In one case,
institutionalization extended beyond the Mont-Royal plant to other plants, even crossing the US
national boundary. In the plant’s vernacular these projects were “flying pigs.” Their success was
so unlikely as to be considered impossible. A final weeklong trip was scheduled in February
2013 to update feedback loops data and validate theoretical findings with key informants.
III.III Research Design
I designed our research at the CPG plant as a single embedded qualitative case study, to
account for the emergent nature of the organizational learning process (Miles and Huberman,
1994) and the revelatory nature of cases of institutionalization and feedback of solutions
generated by frontline project leaders. While Six Sigma has traditionally been focused on
outcomes and variance studies, a process model was most appropriate to study “how” questions
when we need to account for “the complexity of events, the need to account for temporal
connections among events, different time scales in the same process, and the dynamic nature of
processes” (Van de Ven, 2007: 159). Further, I elected to collect the longitudinal study data as
process events unfolded, rather than later, when the project was completed. Under these study
conditions, I could proceed with the data collection and begin the analysis without being biased
by outcomes of success or failure that had yet to occur. Even though this approach carried more
risk and I could not guarantee how interesting the cases might become until much later in the
process, I mitigated that risk by collecting data about 12 units and narrowing it down to four
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selected sub-cases. As an additional benefit, this collect-as-you-go longitudinal design allows
researchers to capture transient effects that might otherwise be forgotten or deemed irrelevant
when analyzed through existing theoretical constructs (Van de Ven, 2007).
In addition to the embedded nature of the case, my unit of analysis—the project
leadership process—develops through three levels of analysis, spanning the individual, group,
and organizational levels. While the CPG Lean Six Sigma case details might be unique, the
intent of the comparative approach for studying the four Green Belt Project leadership process
sub-units is to increase adaptability of the case findings to other settings. Table 4, adapted from
Yin (2009), summarizes the qualitative research design elements used to minimize the threats to
validity.
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Table 4: Design Tactics for Case Study Validity

III.III.i Qualitative comparative longitudinal case studies. We conducted this study as
an explanatory case that illustrates the intuiting, interpreting, integrating, and institutionalizing
processes of the 4I model. Prior research has tended to focus on managers, CEOs, or high-level
thought leaders; in contrast, we examined insights originating from frontline employees.
Unfettered access to study this contemporary event and a research design that did not require
control over the behavioral events (Yin, 2009) allowed us to take full advantage of the case study
method. Furthermore, the distinctive Six Sigma infrastructure (Schroeder et al., 2008) helped us
trace the feed-forward and feedback paths of the solutions originating from frontline employees.
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We chose the comparative case design in order to provide impartial and legitimate comparisons
of cases (Van de Ven, 2007).
The selection process of the embedded units followed a deliberate replication protocol
(Yin 2009) to set up a rigorous analysis and increase the validity of both theoretical and practical
findings. Archival data and detailed documentation from four waves of Green Belt projects
provided the context to operationalize the 4I model in iBPI. The preliminary data collection and
analysis framework became progressively more precise as it became more focused on the twenty
percent of projects continuing until completion. Project outcomes became more visible. Patterns
emerged over time. Specific events and event sequences triggered key organizational learning
events and led to different project outcomes. Specifically, all projects completed their Lean Six
Sigma deliverables but only two led to organizational learning.
Consequently, we segmented potential cases according to these two process outcomes
and, using literal replication logic, selected two cases within each of these segments to confirm
findings. Using replication logic, we selected cases from each of the segments to make cross
comparisons among the OL success, and OL failure cases. Building the case narratives and
collecting data based on the 4I model constructs yielded unexpected results. Surprisingly,
looking at the iBPI case data over a longer period and through OL lenses, revealed projects from
cases 3 and 4 that appeared successful in terms of a completion timeline were much less so from
an institutionalization perspective. Conversely, the two more revelatory cases initially appeared
to be marginally successful (case 1) or failed (case 2).
Our final case selection, focused further on the leadership processes of these four
certified Green Belts, whose projects we studied beyond implementation and sometimes beyond
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project leader certification, through the feedback learning loops of the 4I model. Cases 1 and 2
were the real success stories for organizational learning. Cases 3 and 4 are successful examples
of Green Belt certification but only cases 1 and 2 are successful examples of both certification
and full feed-forward and feedback learning loops. Finally, to increase the rigor of the analysis
phase, we collaborated with key informants in selecting, identifying, and validating rival
explanations (Johnston et al., 1999). Figure 2 outlines the case selection, the replication design of
the study design, and the sequence of analysis of the study.
Figure 2: Case Selection and Analysis Design

III.III.ii Process model. The dynamic nature of organizational learning and the
complexity of the 4I model as a conceptual lens drove the choice of a process model rather than a
variance study. The process approach allows us to understand how organizational learning
occurs over time in a sequence of interrelated events and through social processes across the
three levels of analysis (individual, group, and organization).
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In this process study, we collected outcome data in order to provide context but also
because the outcomes are significant events that have impact over time. For example, keeping
the focus on the progression of events, through the institutionalization process and beyond into
the exploitation of knowledge, shows that some outcomes will be more conducive to further
progression of organizational learning while other outcomes will inhibit organizational learning.
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) propose four generative mechanisms that explain
organizational change: teleology, evolution, life cycle, and dialectics. We adopted two of these
theoretical explanations to guide our data collection and analysis. Preliminary data collection on
the transfer of information is consistent with an evolutionary theory of process, where multiple
entities are going through a prescribed change and must compete for scarce resources (Van de
Ven and Poole, 1995). In that theoretical context, change is a continuous process and the
environment has an impact on the variations that are retained and that, in turn, impact the new
variations that emerge. The dialectic model is more reflective of the struggle for power,
negotiations, and compromises required to change the status quo and fuel the different stages of
the institutionalization process (Van de Ven, 2007). Recognizing the complexity of the process
under study, we used both the evolutionary and dialectic frameworks to guide data collection and
conducted a comparative analysis to see how well one each one explained our findings and
decide whether a dual-motor model (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) was more effective in
explaining how organizational learning unfolded.
III.III.iii Engaged scholarship research model. I undertook this study not only to
produce knowledge but also to provide rich insights as input into a learning intervention for the
Lean Six Sigma Green Belt program at CPG and potentially other organizations. As such, it is a

41

form of design-and-evaluation research targeted at developing an understanding of the context
and the program elements that explain the program outcomes. The research team includes both
internal stakeholders and me as an external observer, in order to draw on a complementarity of
skills and perspectives. As an example of this complementarity, I presented the theoretical
framework to the stakeholders, who helped to validate its adequacy and identified areas requiring
adaptation. These contributions occurred in working sessions scheduled throughout the research
cycle.
I conducted the study in close collaboration with a representative sample of key
stakeholders to ensure the relevance of the problem process, beginning with the problem
formulation and continuing through the theoretical fit of the model, the research design and
analysis, and the implications for practice. This level of participation ensures continued
collaboration as key informants within the research setting may be directly affected by the
outcomes of the study (Van de Ven, 2007). Outcomes potentially include discursive knowledge
dissemination as well as design and implementation of practical solutions.
III.IV Data Collection and Analysis
III.IV.i Data collection. As recommended by Yin (2009), the data collection plan draws
from multiple sources, including archival data, project progress reports, process documentation,
interviews of projects leaders, technical coaches (Black Belts), project champions, peers, field
observation, and participant observation as well as physical artifacts such as tools and parts
developed as part of the improvement process. The data collected in the field setting as the
events occurred was catalogued in the case study database and the interviews (recorded by
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permission) were stored, transcribed, and coded in NVivo and selectively translated from French
into English.
I developed the interview protocol to ensure consistency of the interview process,
beginning with a semi-structured interview and ending with the construction of a key event
process map that I did under the direction of each Green Belt project leader. Interviews with
team members, coaches, and plant managers provided context for the interpretation and
integration stages. I collected company documentation, standard operating procedures, observed
routines, and prescribed practices to evaluate institutionalization, as described by Argyris and
Schön (1996). Over the course of the three phases of the study, I spent 24 weeks on site and
conducted 32 face-to-face interviews, varying in duration from 30 minutes to two hours, within
the study’s 28-month duration.
While the research design remained clearly focused on process key events and key event
sequences, I also collected outcome data to provide additional context for the analysis. I used the
outcome data to place the phases of the project in their DMAIC context and also to delineate the
transitions from one level of the 4I model to the next. Furthermore, Van de Ven (2007: p. 23),
quoting Pettigrew (1990), reminds us that “theoretically sound and practically useful research on
change should explore the contexts, content, and process of change through time. Just as change
is only perceptible relative to a state of constancy, an appreciation of a temporal sequence of
events requires understanding the starting (input) conditions and ending (outcome) results.”
While there are few published empirical studies of the 4I model, the data collection plan
and coding of feed-forward processes and outcomes were guided by the input and outcomes
identified in the original elaboration of the model (Crossan et al., 1999). This framework (see
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Tables 4, 5), which guided the scope of my initial data collection, transcript coding, and data
analysis, was then amended with additional constructs from later elaborations of the model, such
as power and politics (Lawrence et al., 2005), in the next stage of analysis.
Table 5: Learning in Organizations: Four Processes Through Three Levels
(reproduced from Crossan et al., 1999)

III.IV.ii Data analysis strategy. Data analysis was conducted by one researcher, who
worked in collaboration with key informants representing the frontline Green Belt, group, and
senior leadership levels of the organization to provide context for the analysis. I gave specific
emphasis to reviewing the incidents and relationships between events to ensure that the analysis
is consistent with the key informants’ perceptions. I addressed further discrepancies by trying to
collect corroborating data or speak with other informants until both parties agreed to the
interpretation. These informants collaborated in identifying rival explanations for the initial four
cases and helped validate findings. Following the process outlined by Miles and Huberman
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(1994), I studied each case individually with key informants before layering cross-case
comparisons. Next, I studied literal replication cases together, such as the two successful 4I
examples. Then, I compared these cases with the cases that failed to institutionalize.
The raw data collected includes key conversations, classroom experiences, meetings,
coaching notes, and e-mails. This level of granularity for a relatively few number of cases lends
itself to a comparative analysis in which the events are categorized into phases (Yin, 2009).
Specifically, I began analyzing the cases by parsing the events into phases consistent with the
prescribed timeline of the Green Belt training and project development through the phases of the
DMAIC methodology. These phases corresponded to activities and events designed to stimulate
different stages of insight generation, interpretation, and integration.
I then used a second coding scheme to follow the stages of knowledge sharing according
to the phases and constructs of the original 4I model. Both categorizing schemes retained the
temporal sequence and helped put additional patterns into focus.
A third coding scheme emerged from filling out contact summary forms right after the
interviews. Project leaders, recounting certain key events year over year, became very animated
or physically enthusiastic and their voices rose and they spoke faster when they recounted their
“aha” or “light bulb” moments. They cast their eyes down and lowered their voices when they
talked about how long it took them to complete their documentation and certification
requirements. Their language became more guarded, prefacing the facts with qualifiers such as
“I’m not saying that ...” when they spoke of lack of support from a project champion or someone
with formal authority. The correspondence became stronger as the significance of key events
evolved over time. The consistency of this common pattern between cases 1 and 2, in which the
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Green Belts had gone far beyond their required Green Belt scope, and the emergence of a
different pattern in common between cases 3 and 4, in which the Green Belts had delivered
precisely within the Green Belt scope guidelines, led to coding interview transcripts for both
emotional reactions to key events and motivation.
I concluded the data analysis by creating a story narrative and a conceptual model of the
project leadership process in organizational learning in incremental business process
improvement, from insights originating from frontline employees. The resulting process revealed
micro-processes of organizational learning. When I compared these results with the additional
literature on the full 4I model, I found support for the findings and used common terminology
where appropriate. I built on the resulting process to define the role of the frontline project leader
in organizational learning in incremental business process improvement. For the Green Belt
project leader, the process and role of leadership in organizational learning describe the temporal
sequence of observed incidents and perceived events, the description of the key actors, the
implications and consequences of the events, and any additional contextual elements that explain
the unfolding of events through the outcome (Van de Ven, 2007).

RESULTS
In this chapter, I present the results of the embedded case study conducted at CPG
Canada, by providing a narrative of each case. First, I introduce the project leader of each of
the four cases and the outcomes of that case. Then I study how the project leadership process
unfolded through the 4I processes of feed forward and feedback. Finally, I summarize salient
facts about the case.
Project leaders shared the same GB training and were subject to the same corporate
guidelines and performance requirements. Each GB learned the process improvement
methodology and applied it to a practical problem. They learned to use the extensive DMAIC
technical toolkit to develop an evidence-based solution to a recurring business problem. Each
solution was piloted and promised consistent waste reduction. Each GB became certified.
The narratives below follow the sequence of events as they happened and introduce us to
the four project leaders and the context of their projects as they pursued the completion of their
Green Belt projects. The training structure required the use of the prescribed DMAIC method to
guide the sequence of tasks and tools used throughout the project. In turn, these project activities
shaped the context within which the intuiting, interpreting, and integrating feed-forward
processes unfolded. Successful Green Belt project leaders are expected to carry out the
implementation of their solution through group integration. However, this group-level alignment
of resources falls short of the objectives and multi-directionality of organizational learning.
While all four project leaders became Green Belt certified, only our first two cases show
examples of project leadership extending through institutionalization to feedback loops of
learning (Table 6). In our third and fourth cases, even though our project leaders carried out their
46
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expected project activities, the organization failed to capture or capitalize on the individual
learning.
Table 6: Four Cases

IV.I Case 1: The Learner-Sharer
IV.I.i Project leader: Clyde. When he joined CPG Canada 30 years ago, Clyde did not
know that he would play such a central role in the plant’s ability to renew itself in response to the
productivity mandate of the new CEO. His full-time job requires him to supervise the 40 electrotechnicians deployed to repair and maintain the many production lines of the100-year-old plant.
When the corporate mandate to train Green Belts was announced, he volunteered to be part of
the very first cohort of trainees. In his own words, “I was told, ‘You’re too old for this. You
don’t need this. Why would you want to do this?’ But then I told them, ‘If you are going to send
my people to do this, I need to go so I know what you are asking them to do.’”
IV.I.ii Project focus. Clyde selected to focus on “M42 machine downtime” for his
application project during the iBPI training. The objective of the project was to use the DMAIC
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approach to identify the root cause of the problem and to devise and implement a sustainable
solution. The stretch project goal’s objective was to reduce machine downtime and repair
interventions by 75% within three months. Achievement of the learning objectives was measured
against the development goal of project leaders to be Green Belt certified within six months,
after having demonstrated the ability to apply the methodology and to successfully document the
learning.
IV.I.iii Green Belt project outcomes. Over the course of the following 24 months,
Clyde and his project team completely eliminated the causes of defect, prompting the parts
supplier to inquire, “Have you converted to a different machine?” Going from 315 parts
replacement per year to zero in the six months following implementation of the solution
exceeded the stretch goals. Clyde is now Green Belt certified and the solution—which included a
new part, new routines, and a new diagnostic system—is also sustained.
IV.I.iv Transition to organizational learning. To accurately diagnose root causes and
enable a successful control phase, Clyde leveraged a diagnostic software he knew would be of
value throughout the organization. Beyond the success of his project in decreasing machine
downtime and reducing maintenance interventions, his leadership in advocating for the
company-wide institutionalization of the diagnostic software makes his case revelatory of
organizational learning.
IV.I.v Case 1: Feed Forward
IV.I.v.i Intuiting. Being an expert who volunteered to attend the training session and
selected his own project, Clyde approached the Define, Measure, and Analyze phases of Six
Sigma with the confidence of a veteran at solving equipment malfunctions. “I knew it was the
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speed of the machine. It had to be. Absolutely. I mean, what else could it be?” The first divergent
insight emerged as expert certainty failed to match collected data. Even after he checked for
mistakes, the plot from the data collected during the following three weeks showed no
correlation between machine speed and downtime.
In the second iteration of the Measure phase, Clyde cast a wider net for data. Gathering
his team members (his “customers,” as he calls them), he shared his earlier findings, that
variation in speed and throughput did not cause the excessive machine downtime. Then he
invited them to join him in brainstorming potential causes. After a spirited discussion on the
merits of collecting various machine and performance parameters, including many anecdotes of
personal involvement in getting the line back in production, the team compiled a list of potential
causes.
The analysis of the data collected in the following two weeks revealed an unexpected
pattern: 90% of the broken parts causing machine downtime and consuming maintenance
resources were concentrated among six specific parts positioned diametrically opposite from
each other. The pattern was so specific that Clyde knew that he had found a clue to the root cause
and a new set of questions focused on what differentiated these six parts from the remaining 12
identical parts arranged on the machine.
The answers to these questions became clearer when the team members gathered on the
production floor and examined the configuration of the six parts. A cross beam was found to be
generating excessive friction, causing the six parts placed along the beam to fail at a much higher
rate than their counterparts arranged in a circular pattern. Observing the machine helped the team
come to their “aha moment” and make sense of the new data.
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The finding was counter-intuitive at first. However, after resolving the initial incongruity
between their expert opinion and unexpected data patterns, the team developed a joint
understanding of the causes of the problem. Clyde’s excitement was obvious as he reported his
findings during the second training session. In addition to summarizing the need for the project,
he presented fishbone and concentration diagrams representing the team’s contribution to
identifying potential root causes and the frequency and location of broken parts.
IV.I.v.ii Interpreting. The transition from intuiting to interpreting occurred as team
members discussed their experience of coming up with ideas and developed common language
and reasoning to explain and support their findings. The need to find the root cause of the
problem created a context for developing a common interpretation of the findings and a basis for
developing a potential solution. In order to help collect the data, Clyde used a diagnostic system
called Pro, which enabled him to get detailed and frequent data points. Now that they knew what
they were looking for, they noticed that they could detect signs of variation in machine
performance approximately two days before the parts failed.
The interpreting process spanned the end of the Analysis phase and the entire Improve
phase. The true test of the success of the interpreting process was revealed and tested as the team
moved from analysis of the root cause to developing a solution. They identified two potential
courses of action. The first option was to use Pro as an early detection system to replace failing
parts proactively; this option would eliminate all downtime. The second option would be to
reconfigure the parts at a 90-degree angle; this option would eliminate downtime and
maintenance interventions. The team agreed that the second option was the better option to truly
improve the process and provide better long-term benefits.
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The interpreting process and corresponding alignment of language occurred relatively
quickly because the team went through the intuiting process together. The shared insight
producing experience, primed with a mutual goal and common mode of enquiry culminated in
the physical observation of the internal configuration of the machine. This shared “ha-ha”
facilitated the development of shared cognitive maps, shared language, and shared visuals to
represent the developing agreement. At the end of the interpreting process, the team had a
proposed solution that addressed the root cause, design drawings and specifications for the
solution, and the timeline for production submitted by the parts supplier.
IV.I.v.iii Integrating. The integrating process began with the adjustment of group
behaviors to accommodate the new standard operating procedure. Since the solution was
designed to avoid the problem, the only interventions would be by the maintenance crews to
replace the parts. The new parts built by the supplier were installed and a performance dashboard
was created to monitor performance.
Early results showed an increased number of breakdowns. The new solution proved to be
even more problematic than the status quo. The team quickly rallied to diagnose the cause of the
new failures and evolved the design to further reduce friction. It took several months for the new
parts to be redesigned, during which time the team members resumed their normal activities.
No one anticipated that months would elapse between identification of the root cause and
implementation of the new part. Had they known, they might have used option 1 (preventive
maintenance) as an intermediate solution. However, when the new part finally arrived, the team
members quickly installed the new parts. The new design proved successful. Repair interventions
and part replacements, which had numbered over 300 per year and caused production downtime,
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were virtually eliminated, prompting the parts supplier to wonder if the machine had been
replaced.
The outcome artifacts were new SOPs, new product specs, an update of the product
catalog to remove the specs of the previous part to mistake-proof the ordering process, and the
real-time dashboard showing the archival of performance data to diagnose any future
performance variations.
The solution to the Green Belt project was impressive because it uncovered a previously
unknown cause of variation and virtually eliminated defects without requiring additional followup steps for the operators. While the new part solved a problem specific to this machine, the
diagnostic system that enabled a very complete, frequent, and low-maintenance collection of data
addressed a need experienced by all project leaders and many process owners: easy access to
diagnostic data. (Figure 3 shows the loops of learning at the individual and group levels.)
The project served to illustrate the power and effectiveness of performance data to
quantify failure costs, identify root causes, test solutions, and monitor ongoing performance. In
parallel to leading the integration of the practices with the M42 machine, Clyde shared his
insight about the performance improvement opportunities inherent in using the Pro software. He
began using opportunities to share his Green Belt project results to endorse and recommend Pro.
In fact, he served as subject matter expert and presented an introduction to Pro to the next three
cohorts of Green Belt candidates. He also made a member of his team available to help other
Green Belt candidates to program the system and support the data collection process for their
own projects.
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Integration of learning by Clyde’s Green Belt project team members led to the utilization
of Pro as a data diagnostic and management solution by several cohorts of Green Belt project
teams and team leaders. In turn, their subsequent successful utilization of Pro became a salient
topic of conversation among project leaders and project team members who commiserated about
the time-consuming demands of the rigorous data-collection phase. In contrast, Green Belts who
could leverage Pro in their data analysis showed off their sophisticated statistical data displays.
This second group of project leaders had the dual advantage of an effortless and rigorous data
collection that enabled them to complete the Measure phase and more of the Analyze phase,
causing envy among their peers who had yet to use the software.
Over the course of the following two years, usage of Pro in Green Belt projects, which
remained elective, grew to approximately 70%. A community of grateful users continued to
develop as Clyde continued to actively endorse Pro and support new project leaders learning to
use Pro throughout the DMAIC phases. New Green Belts learned to use the data mining
capabilities of Pro to facilitate the intuiting, interpreting, and integrating processes of new
learning related to their improvement efforts, be it machine downtime, customer complaints or
excessive weight variation in finished goods. Pro gave them an advantage in accomplishing their
own process improvements. Often, these grateful Green Belts also became Pro advocates,
helping to support additional feedback loops at the individual and group levels. As Clyde said, “I
have my lieutenants.”
IV.I.v.iv Institutionalizing. Clyde’s advocacy efforts were also directed toward decision
makers and influencers, such as the business unit managers and the plant’s continuous
improvement/quality manager. The continuous improvement manager was able to influence
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usage of Pro within his team of full-time project leaders. Over time, it became the default tool for
data needs, achieving a 100% penetration rate.
Also, these new users continued to evolve the use of the software for increasingly
sophisticated applications. A salient example is how Stan, a newly hired Black Belt, used Pro to
build a real-time diagnostic system of the production line with Pro. Stan joined the company
after Pro was institutionalized as the standard data-mining tool for project leaders. During the
regularly scheduled quarterly Pro training session, he learned how to use the software to create
data tags and have the corresponding performance information captured for future use. Based on
his prior work experience in aeronautics, Stan saw how he could use Pro to collect data about all
the inputs, outputs, and key process metrics on each component of the production line
simultaneously; translate it into performance parameters automatically; and instantly feed that
information into the visual schematic of the full production line he had built on his computer.
Stan had just created a complete, real-time, remote and portable diagnostic system of the
production line he was responsible for improving.
When Stan began his project, there was limited information available about the machines
and their performance on the production floor. The equipment manuals were no longer relevant
because the equipment had been modified over the years. The operators and technicians who
worked with or maintained the machines on a daily basis sometimes offered unreliable and
contradictory advice on machine problems. Now, Stan could see the sequence of events and the
relationships between any two or more tagged variables. He could look at the full production line
or focus on a specific machine. He could ask better questions and generate valid answers with

55

data. He could audit performance levels and detect failures either from his cubicle or from the
production floor because his diagnosis tool was portable.
Stan used this information to facilitate a deeper dialogue with the operators and
maintenance staff. He could put their insights into the context of the data and help them
understand the impact of different work processes or human interventions by showing them the
immediate and long-term impact. For example, the impact of modifying machine settings was
visible not just in their immediate field of vision but also at later stages of the production line.
This capability proved invaluable in identifying transient effects or episodic malfunctions that
some operators had reported but that were hard to capture after the fact. Together, they could
resolve the apparent inconsistencies of the previous incidents. By using the visual displays to
make sense of their diverse experience, Stan could facilitate the group process effectively. They
could develop a shared understanding, create better solutions, and build a foundation for group
problem solving.
The new diagnostic tool accelerated the intuiting, interpreting, and integrating loops. It
contributed directly to inter-organizational learning when the continuous improvement manager
of the U.S. plant saw a live demonstration of Stan’s diagnostic model. Hearing about it second
hand produced mild interest, but seeing it live provoked her to stare at the screen, interrupt the
meeting, and walk to the plant manager’s office to make an impassioned and urgent request for
this solution: “I need this. Now!” The extent of her commitment is even clearer when we
consider that implementing this software would require replacing current software provided by
one of the company’s preferred suppliers. However, because the solution was already vetted and
proven through a large number of projects, the continuous improvement manager could make the
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requested change with confidence. (Figure 4 shows institutionalization and waves of feedback to
the group and individual levels.)
IV.I.vi Case 1 summary. Figure 3 uses Crossan et al. (1999)’s representation of the 4I
model to display the individual and group level loops of learning. The process begins within the
upper left quadrant when Clyde became acquainted with the program and attended the initial
Green Belt class, which set the corporate context for the intuiting process. The first arrow (1)
represents the transition of the initial insight from intuiting to interpreting. The individual insight
about project selection set the project in motion and led to further insights, including the
secondary insight about using Pro.

Figure 3: Case 1, Phase 1 - Successive Loops of Learning
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Next, a set of arrows (2) within the group level links interpreting to integrating. The A
thread represents the unfolding group learning about the M42 machine downtime, while the B
thread represents the unfolding learning about Pro. The conversations that Clyde’s team had
during the interpreting process also instigated distinct learning flows from fellow Green Belt
project teams as they explored using Pro for their own projects (C). The learning flows continue
The C thread of arrows represents this additional branch of group learning.
The third arrows (3A-C) show the feedback loop from the learning of the Green Belt
teams from Clyde’s cohort to project leaders from new cohorts. The feedback loop happened in
formal and informal ways. Best practices sharing sessions during Green Belt training began the
dialogue, which continued in more casual ways within their natural work teams and networks of
everyday relationships. The tangible examples of project applications from the integrating phase
and the sharing conversations added to the Six Sigma program focus on process improvement to
create the new foundation for the next flow of feed-forward learning (4A-C).
Clyde’s case showed successive waves of learning and sharing, resulting in further
individual and group learning processes occurring concurrently. As a result, a larger group of
learners, and a stronger network of learning built over time. The specificities of each successful
application added to the body of knowledge and social connections the interpreting and
integrating processes depend upon. The increasing awareness and credibility led to faster
adoption and integration of Pro. A large network of support built at the individual and group
levels before moving forward to the institutionalizing process (Figure 4).

58

Figure 4: Case 1, Phase 2 - Institutionalization and New Waves of Feedback

The institutionalizing process is distinguished by the transition from mutual adjustments
to routines, diagnostic systems, and rules and procedures. This arrow (5) represents the learning
flow from the collective learning from learning streams A-C and the resulting new insights into
how to leverage Pro for a larger audience and for a longer timeframe. From a sporadic data
collection and analysis tool they began to develop it into a more systematic diagnostic system to
validate improvements and to monitor for sustained performance. The transition to formal and
sustained social and organizational learning structures, such as the required Pro training for fulltime iBPI project leaders, became possible through the authority of a member of the leadership
team. The senior level advocacy of these high level gatekeepers was necessary to sanction new
rules and replace old procedures.
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These new rules and procedures made the learning about Pro available to project teams (6
A-C) and project leaders (7) who had never met Clyde or members of his original Green Belt
team. The learning process still involved social and psychological processes but no longer
depended on knowing the individual who began the organizational learning process.
A new normal had replaced the feed forward flow and become the foundation for new
insights. Overall, we observe a very collaborative process progressing from the individual, group
and organizational levels through a sequence, which follows the high level order of 4I processes
in somewhat less linear than the theoretical model indicates.
Clyde’s case shows that it is possible to institutionalize knowledge emerging from a
frontline Green Belt project. However, the project leadership process, which enabled
institutionalization of the learning at the organizational and inter-organizational levels, is far
beyond the scope of work defined for Green Belt project leaders. Even so, institutionalization
became possible through a senior stakeholder who understood the organizational relevance of
Pro. Over time, the leadership role was shared by the frontline leader who led the development of
the insight into a practical solution, the process owner who influenced its sustained application at
the group level, and the senior leader who championed the institutionalization at the
organizational level.
In this case, Clyde wore two hats, as both the Green Belt project leader and the process
owner, which facilitated the transition to group-level integration. Also, by actively disseminating
his knowledge and experience and consistently supporting others in using Pro, Clyde helped
build a wide and deep network of support for Pro, which lowered potential barriers to
institutionalization. The prolonged group-level integration phase equipped the champions with a
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proven solution with a wide network of support, internal expertise and experience, and a history
of success in addressing an enduring shared need.
Over time, Clyde’s leadership role evolved into the role of a subject matter expert. He
continues his advocacy at the project and plant level. He says that there is much work yet to do.
“We have just begun to scratch the surface of what we can do.”
IV.II Case 2: The Learner-Leader
IV.II.i Project Leader: Jack. Jack is an engaging young, second-generation CPG
Canada employee. Following in his father’s footsteps, he is seeking to move up to a supervisory
role. Volunteering to attend Green Belt training, meant juggling night shift work to attend
daytime classroom sessions. When staffing shortages required him to fill in for his supervisor,
Jack interrupted his formal Green Belt training to devote himself to managing the small team.
His role as full-time team leader in the plant-wide raw materials receiving department gave Jack
access to productivity opportunities that would have been invisible to employees outside the
department.
Recalling his early involvement, Jack says, “I was interested. When they said they were
looking for volunteers for this training, I gave my name. When they approached me, I think, it
was for the third wave. … I had a project idea. I brought it up to Oliver [the continuous
improvement manager at that time]. We really talked about it. I already had ideas. Concrete sort
of stuff about what to do. Where we would go get it. I was in there from the first session. I could
just choose my project. It went pretty well after that.”
IV.II.ii Project focus. The plant’s receiving department was traditionally considered a
cost center and the cost of the pallets used there to receive and store materials from suppliers was
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accepted as a normal cost of doing business. Jack saw an opportunity. “My project was on the
pallets. We spend over $1.4 million a year. So, I estimated about 10% overall if you look at the
whole process, all the gaps. I thought in the end we could save 10%. That’s what I was able to
do. For sure, it required a kind of discipline. You had to stick with it. So I had to [stick with it].”
IV.II.iii Green Belt project outcomes. In order to achieve the overall financial
objective, Jack needed to identify specific saving opportunities in the process. He began by
engaging his work team in mapping the receiving process from the preparation of the production
report that generates the raw materials order to the unloading of the pallets at the receiving dock.
Using DMAIC tools to evaluate the process steps, Jack focused on rush orders due to delivery
delays and inaccurate deliveries as two costly, time-consuming, and non-value-added aspects of
the receiving process for pallets.
The projected financial benefits from Jack’s Green Belt project exceeded the $50,000
corporate savings target. Within 18 months of starting his project, Jack had exceeded his initial
financial objective, with 12.5% of sustained cost savings. The simplified receiving process was
more accurate and enabled a reduction in pallet lead times, from two weeks to four hours.
However, Jack’s Green Belt certification lagged for another year until he completed his formal
Green Belt training and DMAIC project documentation.
IV.II.iv Transition to organizational learning. “Groundhog Day.” This is the movie
metaphor that Jack shared in reflecting back on the repetitive nature of his project experience.
Once engaged in the improvement process, the team identified additional opportunities that were
out of scope for the initial Green Belt project. Using the momentum and enthusiasm generated by
the first success of this project, Jack led two additional consecutive improvement loops, trying
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over and over again until they were successful. Beyond the financial success of his project,
which saved close to 18% under the previous year’s budget, Jack learned how to learn and how
to lead a transactional Green Belt process improvement project. His project became the plant’s
best practice for transactional Green Belt projects.
IV.II.v Case 2: Feed Forward. The feed-forward flow began with Define and unfolded
through the Control phase of the DMAIC process. However, the commitment of the team to
continue to improve the receiving process encouraged them to extend the Control phase beyond
what would be required for Lean Six Sigma certification to a level of institutionalization that
enabled a skillful transition to feedback loops. That scope expansion was facilitated by the fact
that the processes under review were concentrated within the receiving department. Although the
sub-processes leading to integration and institutionalization involved different tasks, they were
conducted by the same employees at the group and organizational levels.
IV.II.v.i Intuiting. “Where I really benefitted was from listening to my peers,” Jack
explained. “Sometimes … maybe at the beginning. It's not my thing. I did not really intend to
bring in many people and have a working team. I wanted mostly to work solo. That’s pretty
much my nature. I really benefitted a lot, you know, … from listening to my peers, the people
who do the work. That’s something I learned … to really listen to them, … trust the people who
do the work everyday. Sometimes you may think so and so [they] cannot really teach me
anything. But everyone— even in life—everyone can teach us something at some level or
another. So, that’s where I really benefitted.”
Working with a transactional process, as opposed to the manufacturing process with
machines that could be modified, Jack understood that implementation of any solution would
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depend on the willingness and engagement of the team of operators working day to day with the
pallets. It began as a simple strategy to build buy-in.
“I came prepared. I brought the doughnuts. I brought the coffee. I asked, ‘How much do
you think these pallets cost us per year?’ Someone guessed: ‘150 K.’ And I said, ‘No. That’s just
10 percent. That’s what we can save if we improve the process.’” He told them that CPG was
spending over $1.4 million a year on pallets. Jack said, “They could not believe it. People did not
know how much it cost and so when they found out the cost they became really interested.”
The outcome of this first meeting convinced Jack that engaging his team could do more
than just build acceptance. It was the key to getting insights and a level of commitment and
ongoing support that would sustain successive waves of improvements. This shift in perception
of his role as leader served Jack well. In fact, the insight that shifted the momentum of the team
from curiosity to active participation was generated during the next team brainstorming session.
Typical iBPI strategies include identifying areas of lower performance to target
improvement efforts. As Jack was reviewing objectives with the team in the Define phase, they
brainstormed potential areas of intervention. As Jack recounts the meeting, one of the team
members interjected that what stood out was the exception process where receiving ran really
well. “We might be better off making the whole thing like the exception rather than trying to fix
the rest.” “The rest” referred to the very broken and cumbersome standard receiving process.
What was said in a humorous, somewhat ironic tone highlighted not only the inefficient state of
the current process but a concrete path forward. After the guffaws quieted, the whole team
enthusiastically discussed how much better the exception process worked and what it would be
like if the entire receiving process worked equally well.
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In this case, the intuiting process occurred in a group setting. Jack primed the
conversation by preparing and organizing the brainstorming session. In this context, the insight
was verbalized by a team member and then quickly discussed by the others, who reviewed their
experiences and came to similar conclusions. Their enthusiastic reaction convinced Jack that this
was an idea worth pursuing.
IV.II.v.ii Interpreting. Within the work team, the transition from intuiting to interpreting
occurred when the idea was spoken. Since that happened in a group context, where team
members were focused on the same problem, the interpreting process quickly moved to a group
process. Discussing the idea among themselves led to converging on a similar insight. Grounded
in their own experiences, the team members rationalized changing “the rest” of the receiving
process to be more like the procedures used for exceptions. Listening to them voice their
arguments in favor of the streamlined process used to prevent production downtime and remedy
shortages in high priority materials, influenced Jack decision. This was a strategy worth
pursuing.
A Green Belt project leader is tasked to study the process and recommend changes.
Implementing these changes, however, went beyond Jack’s scope of control as team leader. The
changes would involve not only changing internal processes but also changing processes
involving two suppliers and another nearby plant. In order to make those changes, he would need
to secure the sponsorship and commitment of his business unit managers to move forward.
Leveraging the Measure, Analysis, and Improve phases and the support of his team, Jack
began to build a case that he could share with the internal decision makers. He built a coalition of
support with representatives of the pallet supplier, who had experienced similar inefficiencies,
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difficulties, and complexities in their relationship with the transporter and had also deployed Six
Sigma. Since Jack’s receiving department and the pallet supplier shared an interest in the
process, shared dissatisfaction, and shared the DMAIC language, Jack and his team found it
easier to create a stronger proposal for change.
On behalf of this team, Jack presented the facts to his immediate leadership team and
then with their support, to corporate decision makers. He included the details of the financial
opportunity, the process maps showing the complexity of the existing process, and reports
showing the cost of delays and inaccuracies caused by the inefficient order-to-receiving process.
He contrasted these reports with reports showing the level of performance of the exception
process, to allow the decision makers to come to the same conclusion as his team: “Why have we
not done this before?”
Despite being visibly cumbersome, the existing process order to receiving pallet process
had been maintained because of a corporate decision made at a much higher level and a
perception that it was more cost-efficient. As Jack later explained the situation, “We knew in our
gut that it did not work, but we were told that this is saving 100 grand a year so we kept it that
way. Someone at corporate had been persuaded that we saved money this way. But that is not
true.” In Jack’s words, the rigor of the project data, the context of the iBPI program and the
support of the pallet supplier had enabled him to reach the “high spheres of transportation at
CPG international headquarters” to successfully challenge a corporate mandate.
Following the agreement to move forward to pilot the process change on a large scale,
Jack and his team created new standard operating procedures, roles and responsibility
descriptions, service-level agreements, and performance dashboards.
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IV.II.v.iii Integrating. The integrating process began with the realignment of internal and
external resources for the two-month pilot. Having involved so many people and escalated his
request through corporate headquarters to obtain permission to conduct the pilot, Jack felt
conspicuously exposed. “One thing is clear,” he said. “I had my head on the chopping block.”
To mitigate his risk and his fear, Jack pursued the integrating phase by continuing to
engage his team. “We needed to make it [the solution] live. It was there but it wasn’t living, so
that’s what we needed to do. So I told the team, … if we can make it live, everybody wins….
And that’s what happened.” The team played an integral part in monitoring performance. “They
could flag any variation, either excess or lack of pallets, so we could manage this closely. Of
course, …. we let them know how much it costs and why it’s important. I was not doing this by
myself. That was nice.”
During our second interview, about seven months after the successful pilot, Jack looked
back at the replacement of the old process and adoption of the exception process as the new
standard by saying, “I do not really have a full year of data to show, but yes, it is working. In
fact, for the past three weeks, it has been happening without me being involved at all.”
When asked about his Green Belt certification, Jack apologized. “I did not complete all
my training and I have not really documented what I did. That’s what’s missing. But really I am
not sure all this is necessary. I did what mattered. I have recouped my personal investment.
Sometimes you can have nice numbers but in reality nothing happened. But not here. We really
changed something.”
Jack became so engaged in managing the improvement project that he canceled his last
training session. The continuous improvement team thought that Jack had dropped out of the
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program. When I reached out to him in the second phase of the research, to help explain the
causes of project attrition, I was surprised to discover how far the project had progressed. Jack
explained that his full-time responsibilities on the production floor made it very difficult to focus
on his formal project deliverables. Jack’s focus on “doing what mattered” allowed him to move
the project forward even though he had little time and frequent interruptions. Against this
backdrop, he saw no value in keeping up the formal DMAIC project documentation
requirements: that was just for certification. Claudia, the Black Belt who manages the Green Belt
certification program re-established the dialogue and helped ease the steep learning curve of the
analytical tools. With her support, Jack could both learn and focus on leading the team.
IV.II.v.iv Institutionalizing. Jack arrived at our third interview a year later with a
confident stride, square shoulders, his head held high, and a satisfied smile on his face. He
immediately handed me a copy of his project documentation. “This is what I presented to the
Green Belt certification panel.” In the wake of the successful pilot, Claudia had challenged Jack
to complete his Green Belt certification. Jack attended the third and final formal training session,
which closes with the Control phase, with its emphasis on the need to create processes to sustain
positive change and to document project findings. When Jack presented his results to the plant
certification panel, he could easily demonstrate his path from project selection and problem
definition to solution implementation and process control. Jack’s emphasis on “doing what
matters” was underscored by the fact that his impressive financial results had been validated by
the plant’s finance manager.
What initially appeared to Jack to be a bureaucratic requirement motivated him to finalize
the new standard operating procedures, roles and responsibility descriptions, service-level
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agreements, and performance dashboards. That level of operationalization and documentation
signaled the transition from integration to institutionalization. The change, which had become the
default mode of operation for the team, could now survive even if Jack moved on and even if
there were a drastic team turnover or a new team took over the function. Jack could now share
performance data throughout the organization, reinforcing the positive changes and new
understanding of the true cost structure of transportation. That performance stability and
acknowledged shared success provided a strong foundation and a fertile context for additional
rounds of improvement.
IV.II.v.v Feedback loops within the plant (organizational to group level). When he
began the iBPI project, Jack told the team, “It’s not my project, it’s a project. And I need your
help to see it through.” Once the team accepted Jack’s invitation, the process of leadership
changed. Over time the team members took more and more initiative, making further suggestions
and volunteering to help, and Jack then managed the flow and focus of work. While the team
members remained engaged throughout the subsequent loops of the improvement process, Jack
reports that he needed to moderate the enthusiasm of the team so they could move forward to
other improvements while he needed to focus on integrating changes.
The desire of the team to improve the process beyond its new level of performance
reassured Jack that the control phase would lead not only to documented changes but also to
stabilized improvement behaviors. Thus, resources could be freed to invest in the next level of
improvement without jeopardizing the results of the newly integrated changes. “It was maybe
more than a Green Belt project,” Jack said. “It was more like three small Six Sigma projects one
after another that produced this big result.”
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IV.II.v.vi Feedback beyond the plant. The benefits of the institutionalization process
extended beyond the team and beyond the plant. Project leaders from U.S. plants who were
searching for productivity improvements in their receiving departments sought Jack as a
resource. “I received this call from a continuous improvement manager from a plant in the U.S.
He was wondering if we would be able to save money by centralizing the transportation process
through corporate. I don’t know how he got my name, but I was not only able to tell him what I
did not think this was a good idea but I was able to send him my whole presentation.”
Jack closed our third interview with a final reflection, knowing that his experience was
atypical of the experiences of other Green Belts. “I was expecting a lot more resistance, you
know. But that did not happen. People who work on the floor kept saying, “So, how is it going?
Am I going to get my name someplace? They were really supportive. … I know, it sounds like a
fairy tale. I was really lucky.”
After a few incremental moves in other parts of the plant, Jack moved back to receiving,
now as the department’s supervisor. When I asked about the performance of the process, he was
happy to report that he does not need to follow up because he knows it is working. “I trained the
woman who replaced me as team leader. She knows which data to pull. The results are posted on
the floor. But I don’t need to look at it at all. They take care of it. It’s their baby.”
IV.II.vi Case 2 summary. Figure 5 shows the sequential loops of feed-forward and
feedback flow which sustained the dynamic learning environment of Jack’s working team. Jack
used the narrow focus required of a well scoped Green Belt project (A) to concentrate his efforts
and the support of his team on delivering a successful solution to his initial project requirement.
The solid blue arrows show the feed forward flow of his project, all the way through
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institutionalization. The first arrow spans the individual and group levels to show the intuiting,
interpreting and integrating processes.
Figure 5: Case 2 - Sequential Loops of Feed-Forward and Feedback Flows

The insight to emulate the exception process was very clear. However, sharing their
mental maps to explain the need for change and adapting current procedures to the desired state,
required many conversations, working sessions and mutual adjustments. To even pursue this path
would have required the approval of a line manager. Jack’s acting supervisor role while his
manager was on extended sick leave gave him the freedom and resources to develop the idea into
a full fledge proposal and provided direct access to the next level of leadership. The second solid
blue arrow shows the link between the group and organizational levels through the
institutionalizing process. Institutionalization required the support of the corporate gatekeeper
since the decision to outsource the management of the pallets was a corporate mandate. Jack
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used his Green Belt project as a context to build the case and make the proposal. He leveraged
the support of his team, the credibility of the method, and the documented performance of the
exception process to obtain permission to run a pilot. This collaborative process included the
endorsement of existing suppliers who could share their painful experience and marked
preference for a change. The institutionalizing process occurred over time. Results of the pilot
showed potential for sustained financial improvement and the corporate gate keeper agreed to a
permanent change in procedures.
The solid green arrows show the feedback loops from the organizational level back to the
group and individual levels as the new process replaced the old. The change extended from one
team to all shifts. The new process satisfied the corporate need for hard savings and simplified
the tasks of the material handlers (with fewer touch points). And while new teams gladly
adjusted to the change, Jack’s Green Belt team began to tackle the next set of improvements (B).
This next set of ideas followed a similar feed forward and feed back learning flow, only faster.
The team grew to trust the process, their ability to problem-solve and the willingness of the
leadership team to listen and take timely action. They became bolder and made more requests.
Jack built on this learning momentum, the success and credibility of the first improvement and
his new network of relationships with suppliers and corporate gate keepers to get approved and
move forward with implementation. Jack also expanded his dashboards to document and
communicate additional benefits and hard savings from their continued efforts. The successful
institutionalization and the adoption of the feedback flow (B) spurred a third round of process
improvements (C) to address the remaining concerns of the working team.
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This case illustrates how the 4I processes works over time and indicates how some
processes of team leadership, in addition to managing the stock and flows of knowledge, can
help generate and sustain a virtuous tension between exploring new ways and maintaining the
integrity of functional existing processes. In this case, employees at each level of the
organization benefitted. At the individual level, the project leader not only earned certification
but also saw the payoff for his personal investment. At the group level, both internal and external
pallet supplier teams were empowered by their participation in effecting sustainable positive
change in their daily work processes. Finally, the organizational level also benefitted from the
documentation of more current knowledge in a sharable format, a simplified and more efficient
process, and an annual stream of productivity savings.
The 4I model of organizational learning gives us rich insights into the role of frontline
leaders in iBPI initiatives and into the processes of achieving productivity and organizational
learning results. Frontline leaders work with exacting details and provide a level of granularity in
analyses that may not be visible at higher levels of formal authority. Frontline iBPI project
leadership can also create deep engagement. This deep engagement serves as an environment
that builds a deep level of support at the lowest levels of the organization and creates the microconditions to generate commitment, enthusiasm, and skill transfer for successive rounds of
improvement.
IV.III Case 3: The Solo Learner
IV.III.i Project Leader: Darren. Darren, a long-time employee of CPG Canada, was
selected by the director of the cheese department to attend Green Belt training. Though his fulltime job as a plant mechanic focuses on maintenance and repairs, Darren accepted the
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opportunity to attend the fourth wave of training and lead an improvement project as another
problem-solving challenge. “Perry [director] offered me the opportunity. I accepted. I think it
was a vote of confidence.” As part of his improvement project, Darren could now spend some of
his 12-hour shift on loan to the cheese department, one of the top profit centers of the plant.
IV.III.ii Project focus. When Darren began his training, he was assigned to “help reduce
machine downtime and repair interventions” in the cheese department. Even though the
assignment seemed a perfect fit for his skills, Perry (the department head) and Cindy (the
assistant department head) quickly realized that this assignment was too broadly defined. In an
effort to leverage the experience of Len, the external process improvement consultant working in
the department, Darren was assigned a smaller project, which dovetailed into the massive
productivity initiative for which Len was responsible. While Len continued working on all
sources of variation on the production line to achieve 3 sigma, i.e., 99.99% production run
effectiveness, Darren would focus on time and costs associated with changeovers between
production runs.
IV.III.iii Green Belt project outcomes. Darren worked on his project for eight months.
His final project intervention came shortly after Len left the department, having carried out his
mandate and successfully tested the line’s 3-sigma capability. Darren is now Green Belt
certified. He looks back fondly at his opportunity to get involved and improve processes: “I
really loved doing this. I even did a few side projects.” But he is skeptical that his intervention
has had a lasting effect. “I am no longer in the department and I don’t know if they are still using
what I did. I mean, I know they learned something …, but I know for a fact they are not
weighing the barrels [of cheese waste] anymore.”
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IV.III.iv Transition to organizational learning. Darren’s case illustrates how iBPI
projects can attain process improvement milestones and yet fail to deliver on productivity
expectations. Reviewing the case through the lenses of the 4I model of organizational learning
enables insight into the contribution of a learning orientation to evaluating iBPI projects as they
unfold over time.
IV.III.v Case 3: Feed Forward
Darren’s project was closed abruptly. In spite of a successful pilot of the new changeover
methods, the project was concluded short of implementation. The feed-forward transfer of
learning from individuals to groups was interrupted before integration and institutionalization.
Though the interruption of the feed-forward flow became apparent on the verge of
implementation, a closer look through the lens of the 4I model reveals earlier process
discontinuities.
IV.III.v.i Intuiting. Per his project charter, Darren’s objective was to improve the
changeover process with a specific focus on reducing raw materials waste. Because of the high
unit cost, annual waste of raw materials on the production line exceeded $300,000. Darren does
not remember anything special about his first insights, reporting that his observations were
common sense. While a changeover project might be more suited to a SMED (Single-Minute
Exchange of Die) or Lean approach, the DMAIC framework required Darren to complete the
Define and Measure phases. This included validating the accuracy of the data collection
measurement system.
Being external to the department, Darren mainly observed and asked questions. Working
without an assigned team, he approached operators on the production floor, asked questions to
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validate his observations, and tried to understand how the department worked. Occasionally he
had the support of two or three operators assigned on a rotating basis to assist with specific data
collection tasks on the N36 machine at the heart of the department. After two or three weeks with
up to eight changeovers per week, Darren made two key observations.
His first insight was that the cost of waste was miscalculated and underestimated. The
cost was calculated based on the volume of cheese, which was extrapolated by the weight of its
containers. Darren observed that operators on the production floor always used the same weight,
though there was a significant variation of weight between empty barrels. Upon weighing the
barrels, Darren verified that the standard number used by floor operators overstated the weight of
the barrels and therefore understated the weight of the lost cheese.
His second insight was that the floor operators accepted lost cheese as a cost of doing
business, because in raw form the cheese could be recycled. The efficiency calculations showed
it as a waste because it was considered an opportunity cost, but to the operators on the line, that
was merely an accounting game, because they knew that unpackaged cheese could be recycled.
To Darren, this way of thinking was costly. When the logic of accepting waste as a cost of doing
business was extended from raw materials to work in process or finished goods, the cost of the
waste was much higher. The cost of the wasted cheese was higher, but more importantly, once
the cheese was packaged, any waste could no longer be recycled and had to be written off.
Darren made key recommendations that included making setting changes at the
beginning of changeovers more precise and responding faster to production interruptions at the
end of changeovers. The optimal settings had been precisely determined and tested by Len and
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his team as part of their overall project. Darren estimated that both changes would dramatically
reduce the $300,000 annual estimated changeover-related waste on the machine.
Darren experienced his intuiting process in a subtle way. He refers to his initial findings
as natural outcomes of following the DMAIC method. In contrast, he became visibly animated
and enthusiastic when he spoke of being given an opportunity to get engaged in making some
improvements. “That is where the value is,” he said. He referred to his insights very quickly and
specifically in the context of sharing them or trying to get them into practice. He wanted to move
his insights beyond the intuiting process through interpreting and integrating and into
institutionalizing.
While reducing time and costs of changeovers was the stated focus of the project, Darren
thought the added cost of the weight variation deserved attention, too. With up to $100,000/year
at stake, he decided to pursue this opportunity as well.
IV.III.v.ii Interpreting. The transition from intuiting to interpreting was marked by the
documentation of the inaccurate weighing procedure. Following up on his second insight, Darren
showed the variation between actual and reported weights and the cost implications. Using the
company iBPI project templates, Darren summarized his findings and presented them to his
cohort on the first day of his second iBPI training session. In addition to the project charter
highlighting the focus on changeovers, he had also documented his measurement systems
analysis findings and an overall cost estimate.
Darren presented his findings in the “green room,” which was set up as a place for the
production team employees to meet daily or weekly, at the beginning or the end of production
shifts. This was the place to get updated on production changes or discuss ongoing or upcoming
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projects. Scattered across the walls of the green room walls were performance reports and
improvement project documentation. On every wall were copies of project charters, control
charts, decision rules, floor plans, or machine schematics representing the long months of
detailed and focused work on Len’s project.
Darren recalls when he first presented his findings to the assembled team of daytime
operators and department leadership members. “It was like suddenly there was a chill in the
room.” After a while they began engaging and said, “Well, here’s your $40,000, here.” After
Darren answered some clarifying questions, Cindy (the assistant department head) announced
her decision to move forward.
Interpreting began as an individual activity. Then Darren shared the information with his
training cohort and a sub-group of operators. Everybody agreed to the accuracy of the
calculation, but these same facts held different implications for Darren and for the team
members. At the end of the interpreting process, the team had an agreement about the current
state and a mandate to apply the recommended changes.
IV.III.v.iii Integrating. The integrating process began with the adjustment of group
behaviors to accommodate Darren’s recommendations. Since the new machine settings had been
tested and validated, further work could focus on changing work procedures.
For a few weeks, Darren participated in every other N436 changeover. At a rate of four
practices per week, the new procedures were simple to implement. Darren not only confirmed his
insights, but also was able to measure the impact of the changes. “I don’t know if they were
doing it when I was not around, but while I was there we did some really nice changeovers.”
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Then Len’s project assignment was cut short. With machine settings validated to
establish production capability at a 3-sigma level, the technical work was completed. In light of
the very aggressive productivity savings expectations for the plant, it was becoming harder to
justify the continued consulting expense.
A week after Len departed, Darren was thanked for his work and told that his project was
also finished. In his words, “Ils ont dit ‘Merci’ et que mon projet était terminé.” (In French, to
thank somebody, “remercier quelqu’un,” may mean “to thank someone” or “to fire someone,”
depending on the context.)
A few months later, eight months after starting his Green Belt training, Darren presented
his project summary to the Green Belt certification panel. The process owner from the cheese
department was not in attendance. Darren did not know how the process continued to perform
after he left. “We improved the method of work for sure. People react faster—an operator or a
mechanic—because when something goes wrong, you know what you have to do because you
worked on the machine before. I am sure they do nice changeovers.” However, the walls of the
green room are empty, no new projects have been initiated, and the production line is down
frequently enough that everyone can tell performance levels are below 3 sigma. The simple
solution to Darren’s project was not sustained. Once Len and Darren left the department, no
advocate replaced them.
An analysis using the 4I model shows that this project had limited engagement at the
group level. Darren shared his insights with the larger group and they agreed with his analysis of
the numbers, but did not share his enthusiasm. For Darren, it meant moving one step closer to
completing his project. For the operators, it meant additional levels of complexity and scrutiny
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and it meant more and faster work with every production changeover. For their supervisors, it
meant having to continuously observe and enforce new procedures that did not seem sustainable.
This is not something that could be expressed directly, so it wasn’t. But as Len left and there was
less visibility for the project, behaviors relaxed away from the rigor of execution of the new
standard operating procedures.
Interviews with other key informants shed some light on some of the unspoken issues.
“They were happy when he [Darren and/or Len] left. It was too heavy [too much work].”
Another informant confirmed, “They thought it was a project: it was going to end and then
everything would be done automatically. They would just have to sit and chat. I don’t mean to
say that they are lazy. ... But they thought it was going to end.” After Darren shared these
insights during our last interview, he added, “If they did not implement his [Len’s]
recommendations, I don’t think they implemented mine either.” (Figure 6 shows how the feedforward flow was interrupted.)
IV.III.v.iv Case 3 feedback loops. No feedback loops resulted from this project. On the
one hand, this outcome is to be expected, since institutionalization did not occur. On the other
hand, closer scrutiny of the causes of discontinuity in the integration phase could have yielded
valuable insights. After all, the ability to execute changeovers efficiently is critical for a plant
with 48 lines producing over 600 stock-keeping units (SKUs).
IV.III.vi Case 3 summary. Figure 6 shows the learning flow of this case through the
integration process where the project stalled. Falling short of successful integration or
institutionalization, the learning flow remained dependent upon the presence of the project
leader. Intuiting followed a sustained project effort to gather information about the problem.
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Committed to succeed, even as an outsider to the Cheese processing department, Darren
followed the Green Belt project protocol and asked the many questions articulating the Define
and Measure phases. The feed forward flow follows the path of Intuiting through integrating.

Figure 6: Case 3 - Feed-Forward Flow Interrupted

In Darren’s case this Green Belt project is mostly an individual effort, until he shares his
interpretation at the departmental group meeting. By then, he has a strongly supported idea of the
cause of the problem and proposes a clear solution to the group level gatekeeper. The solution
satisfies the financial requirements of the project so the official and public venue, forces an
approval which lacks the engaged support of true commitment. Line employees working on days
scheduled for the pilot follow suit and change procedures with little care or interest. Moving
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swiftly to pilot means using the proposed solution as-is, without the benefit of gathering or
incorporating the operators’ preferences in the “how-to”. The solution to-be piloted is perceived
like other corporate dictates as a “fait accompli” to either accept or actively avoid. Despite
promising and tangible savings during pilots, procedural changes are not sustained. The forward
flow of learning fails to stabilize and even appears to recede occasionally, as though there is no
shared understanding. On days when Darren works in a different department, line employees
revert back to their previous process even during the pilot period. When the focal point of senior
leadership team shifts to another department the group level gatekeeper formally withdraws her
support. She informs Darren that his job is complete and that his project leader services are no
longer needed. Without the benefit of team support or gatekeeper backing, even changes that
occurred sporadically, disappeared altogether.
Overall, Darren’s case highlights the importance of each stage of the organizational
learning process. The short-term compliance that Darren observed during the beginning of the
integration phase may have been related to the light and intermittent group-level engagement
during the interpreting process. Also, differences in how organizational learning developed
within each of the 4I processes and how transitions occurred from one process to the next could
yield some valuable insight into project leadership and why some process improvement ideas
proceed through institutionalization to the feedback flow while others do not.
IV.IV Case 4: The Solo Knower
IV.IV.i Project Leader: Jay. Jay is a quiet, focused, and busy technical supervisor at
CPG Canada. Though his full-time job is primarily focused on maintenance and repairs, he took
the nomination for the Green Belt training program in stride. After all, he had worked on other
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improvement projects in the course of his maintenance career. Over the next few months, Jay
split his time between his Green Belt training, his Green Belt project, and his full-time job. “As a
supervisor, your agenda is pretty rock and roll. I mean, you have to find time between meetings.
And two other supervisors had left, so I was covering three jobs. It was not easy.”
IV.IV.ii Project focus. A month after starting his first Green Belt training session, Jay
received his first project assignment from Laurent, the plant continuous improvement manager. It
was a downtime reduction project located at the plant’s central palletization facility. Jay spent
the following month carving out time in his schedule to try to build a team and collect diagnostic
data. Despite repeated attempts, his efforts remained fruitless. Following up on his project update
from his final training session, he met with Jacques, his Black Belt coach. Jacques recalls the
meeting: “He was very concerned [about his first project]. So, then I said, ‘Why don't you do
this?’ And then he was so relieved.”
The second project assigned to Jay consisted of decreasing costs caused by volume
fluctuation in filling machines on the B12 production line in the sauces department. Jacques, the
Black Belt, had just completed a similar project as part of a much bigger initiative involving the
entire production line. He guaranteed the availability of data, the entire project protocol, and
even the actual outcome. This was a sure way of completing the project, delivering the bottomline savings, and getting Green Belt certified. The project was on the upcoming list of the
department’s productivity improvement priorities and the operators could see the completed
example on the nearby production line. Also, it would require less time from their already busy
schedules. So what could possibly go wrong?
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IV.IV.iii Green Belt project outcomes. Jay’s solution was implemented about 18
months later. Looking back at his 36-month certification journey, Jay reflected on what he
learned and how it was applied. “The solution delivered about 60% less than we thought, but it
still turns out to be about $26,000 to $30,000 a year, every year. It looks like a small amount, but
that’s what I learned. With the kind of volume we have around here, small amounts like one mil
here and there can add up to a lot. And that is something that has changed. That was a cultural
change we all went through. Now we see project opportunities that we would not have seen
before. And if you do that everywhere, then that adds up to a lot of money.”
Unbeknown to Jay, his solution’s programming change was deactivated. It’s hard to tell
precisely when it happened. But Henry, the new Black Belt in change of the line, found out by
chance. He was then told that the programming was faulty. Henry trouble-shot the programming
and made the subtle requested changes and reinstated the control loop change. But three days
later, it was deactivated again. And so it remained as of our last interview.
IV.IV.iv Transition to organizational learning. While Jay was exploring a new process
improvement method, he was exploiting the outcome of Jacques’ overfill project. Reviewing the
case through the lenses of the 4I model of organizational learning illustrates the relationship
between the feed-forward and the feedback flows and gives us a deeper understanding into the
boundary conditions of how feedback unfolded through to the group and individual levels.
IV.IV.v Case 4: Feed Forward. The feed-forward process began with the assignment of
the first project. Despite his prior problem-solving experience, Jay was new to the palletization
area and new to Lean Six Sigma. As he began the Define and Measure phases of his project, he
felt very much the mix of excitement and uncertainty of launching the program. The poster-
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sized, autographed picture of the first cohort still hangs in the training room. In the middle of the
picture, a very evocative drawing of a pair of gloved hands holding a pickaxe and protruding
from a mound of dirt bears their name: “Green Belt Pioneers.”
IV.IV.v.i Intuiting. Jay spoke of these early months in metaphors. “We broke the ice.”
And that is telling in the midst of extreme Canadian winter weather. This metaphor refers to
setting the program in motion. However, like the early sailors who gave us this metaphor by
stepping out to physically break the ice holding the boats close to shore, this metaphor is also
descriptive of the early months of trying to find traction and create forward motion in an
environment that would change from rigid to shifting unpredictably.
The concerns of the Green Belts participants ranged from the newness and high visibility
of the program, balancing full-time work responsibilities, the handicap of starting the program
without a project, and falling behind the others in the cohort. Now even with a project assigned,
the frustrating inability to collect data seemed insurmountable to Jay when we talked during the
project updates of the third training session. “I can’t estimate savings for the business case, or
even collect data to confirm the size of the opportunity. And if we cannot even verify these
estimates, then how am I going to be responsible for delivering these savings, if we don't even
know if those are real numbers? And how am I even going to do that, if I cannot even collect
data? I have a full-time job, and the current process is so manual that there is no way I can
collect data automatically. I tried with the operators on the floor, but it took a long time, I did not
get a lot of data, and I have no way of validating the accuracy of the measurement system. And
you say that I have to do that to get certified, that I have to save an average of $50,000?”
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When these questions came up during the project updates of the third training session,
Jay asked for help. By our final interview 36 months later, Jay no longer mentioned his first
project: “It’s been a while.”
But Jacques, his Black Belt coach, still remembers clearly the conversation that led to the
change of project. “I realized that his initial project was too complex and too big. He was pretty
exposed. He had little support …. No one had done this project before. The project was imposed
on him. He had no choice. The project was pretty vague, ill-defined. Had he kept this project, he
would have never finished. I had this project I had just done. It was done. It was easy. I had the
pattern for him and I could help him do it. He was so, so happy to be out of an impossible project
and being given a project that would work. His level of anxiety on his project went from 100% to
10%. That was the key moment of his project.”
After this conversation, with answers in hand and reassured by the supportive
engagement of his Black Belt, Jay could relax into following the project protocol. Using the
DMAIC tools to replicate the project protocol and eliminate technical parameters from the
sources of variation took less than a month.
As expected from looking at the project that Jacques led, the weight fluctuations were not
related to volume, density, speed, or any of the machine-controlled parameters. They were
caused by human manipulations. Two weeks later, the control loop—i.e., the programming
solution designed to eliminate the variation of these human manipulations—was ready to
implement.
Jay, who is a disciplined Green Belt, applied the DMAIC tools rigorously. Even months
later, he speaks of carrying out the Measure and Analysis work with the ease of a long-term iBPI
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practitioner. “We pulled all the variables, for the machines, the density system, everything to
make sure they did not introduce any variation in our control loop. We could confirm that the
filler or the scale or the product density—our key variables—were not the source of variation. So
we looked at anything that could contribute noise into the measurement and knew it was not due
to the equipment. That was stable. Then we did some measurement analysis studies to
understand the measurement variation between different shifts, between different operators,
between filler heads. So we knew what was left was to remove the operational variation.”
IV.IV.vi Case 4 summary. Figure 7 shows the learning flow of this fourth case. The
project began with the feedback flow (1) from a previously institutionalized project and proceeds
through the individual level back to organizational level institutionalization-like activities (2).
The changes are unstable and eventually result into a return to the status quo (3). In bypassing
the individual and group learning processes in favor of a learned response and a forced
institutionalization process, Jay failed to build the foundation for successful change. This case
provides deep insights into the elements that are necessary to create the kind of vibrant and
dynamic feedback loops that lead to successful feed forward learning flows.
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Figure 7: Case 4, Phase 1 - Feedback Flow and Unstable Institutionalization

Under Jacques’ tutelage, the replication of the project deliverables proceeded with expert
efficiency and without surprises, good or bad. During the six weeks that elapsed from problem
definition to solution, there were no “light bulb” moments that Jay recalled. The discovery phase,
i.e., Define and Measure, which helps jump-start the intuiting process by identifying contrasting
areas of performance, began with the first project before any significant insight emerged. For the
second project, Jay was relieved of the anxiety of figuring out how to apply DMAIC or find a
solution, so he could focus on exploiting Jacques’ proven solution and carve out enough time to
tend to the activities of his full-time job. The perception of success and enforceable change leads
Jay to the conclusion that the project is finished and to stop project related activities. The

88

corresponding lack of follow-up causes the alteration in the programming to go unnoticed for a
long time. Figure 8 shows the second unstable attempt at institutionalization.
When Henry studies the line, learns about the improvement project (4) and eventually
discovers the deliberate change he asks the work team why it was changed and left unreported.
Addressing the reported technical gap in performance (5) Henry modifies the programming once
again. There is a high level dialogue but not mutual understanding, interpretation or agreement.
There is high level consultation but not willing integration since two days later the programming
change is deactivated once again. Without team support or active gate keeper sponsorship Henry
stops as well and the feed forward learning flow recedes back (6) from the organizational level.
Figure 8: Case 4, Phase 2 - Another Case of Unstable Institutionalization
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In case 4, knowing the answer was not sufficient to lead to group or organizational learning.
Neither did it produce sustained change and ongoing benefits. The organization failed to capture
the learning from the successful pilot of initial project leader (Jacques). The short-term focus on
institutionalization also prevented discovery and learning from the failure to enact and sustain
changes. Failing to learn how to institutionalize learning, the social and psychological
organizational learning process served to replicate the flaw (Jay and Henry), learning how to
institutionalize failure. This case reveals feed back flows to be an important foundation for
ongoing organizational learning, complex beyond mere consultation and replication.

DISCUSSION
This research study draws from the dual objectives of engaged scholarship to contribute
to both knowledge and practice. Acknowledging the impact of the DMAIC context on the
organizational learning process, I review the contribution of this study to the practice of
organizational learning in iBPI. Next, I review the contribution to the theoretical framework, by
contrasting results from four cases of iBPI project leadership as analyzed through the lenses of
the 4I model.

Using the analogy of a tree, Crossan et al. (2011:451) caution us to avoid creating
additional complexity and further fragmentation of the field of organizational learning. Instead of
additional leaves, they invite contributions to new branches, such as the role of leadership as it
relates to the 4I processes and the role of power, politics, and emotion in organizational learning.
These branches would extend a theory of organizational learning to include how employees
relate to structures that locate them in positions of inequality or impotence and to account for the
role of leadership and followership beyond an upper echelon perspective. Further, Crossan et al.
recommend extending our theories of organizational learning to include a focus on practice and
activities in the foreground to explore learning within levels and across levels “like an accordion,
in which we can compress the levels placing the practice or activity in the foreground of
theorizing and the levels in the background. Or we can expand the levels and expose the
multilevel relationships that hold the practice in place” (2011:454).
To serve our dual purpose of engaged scholarship we follow these recommendations and
first expand the accordion of iBPI practice to unpack 4I learning processes and reveal connecting
threads to the aforementioned branches and leaves. The theoretical lens of the 4I model allows us
90
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to see connections that might have remained hidden. The comparative case analysis
provides rich insight into enablers and barriers to organizational learning in iBPI and forms the
basis of our contribution to the practice of organizational learning in iBPI.
Compressing the accordion back into the 4I’s we use the context of iBPI practice to
contribute to the theoretical framework. The understudied viewpoint of organizational learning
originating from frontline employees, offers a complementary perspective to understand why and
how some ideas become institutionalized when others do not. Frontline leadership emerges as a
significant factor in facilitating the multilevel relationships which hold the practice in place, and
forms the basis of our contribution to the 4I model of organizational learning.
V.I Contribution to the Practice of Organizational Learning in iBPI
A disciplined improvisation distinguishes the first two project leadership processes. They
followed the DMAIC methodology until the Control phase and forged a path through
institutionalization and feedback to organizational learning. Using a collaborative approach to
leading iBPI projects, they leveraged team and organizational, formal and informal, resources. In
addition to gathering great project data, these engaged project teams provided partnership in
generating insights, testing understanding, developing shared cognitive maps, and integrating the
solution. The collaborative aspect extended to close working partnerships with project
champions and other key stakeholders who controlled the formal approval and resource
allocation processes. This scope was sufficient to complete the projects and meet GREEN BELT
certification requirements. Beyond this scope, Green Belts successful at organizational learning
continued to lead in creating awareness of the benefits and commitment to widespread solution
implementation.
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V.I.i Organizational Learning Facilitators in iBPI
V.I.i.i DMAIC intuiting and interpreting processes. The DMAIC methodology is
designed to generate process improvements by guiding Green Belts and their teams through a
logical sequence of steps. Within each DMAIC phase (Table 1), the toolkit is organized to focus
the Green Belts on a relevant business problem, identify knowledge gaps, and prime the teams to
generate and evaluate answers. This systematic approach focuses the learning experiences and
causes knowledge gaps to arise progressively throughout DMAIC. In response, so do the
intuiting and interpreting processes. Specifically, knowledge gaps and insights arise in the Define
phase (scoping out the project), the Measure phase (scoping out the problem and collecting
potential root-cause data), the Analyze phase (identifying root causes of defects and separating
the “trivial many” causes from the “vital few”), the Improve phase (developing a solution), and
the Control phase (helping maintain the solution).
To complete a DMAIC phase and move to the next one, the project leader and the team
must provide explicit answers to the questions that arise from each gap. If the answer is known,
it is documented and verified with data; it then becomes the foundation for the next stage of the
process. If the known answer proves to be erroneous or if the team does not know the answer,
they continue to seek an explanation. Potential answers are then tested empirically to ensure a
stable foundation for the next analysis level. While the original 4I model does not specifically
identify steps between the interpreting and integrating processes, we observe that only some of
the interpreted insights are fed forward in the learning process. The DMAIC process sheds some
light on how the evolutionary selection process plays out. After brainstorming, the Green Belt
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needs to explain the relationship between the insight and the knowledge gap in order to carry the
insight forward in the DMAIC process. At the individual level, this selection process can
manifest through insights that may not be interpreted or shared because the Green Belt believes
that others will not accept them.
V.I.i.ii DMAIC testing and experimenting, and reaching stability processes. The
DMAIC process illustrates how this evolutionary process develops. Analysis uses a data-driven
approach to guide project leaders to rely on logic rather than gut feelings. Evidence of these
short-lived insights and of the testing and experimenting subprocesses at the individual level
became apparent when I interviewed the project leaders or compared iterations of the project
documentation. Some insights survived the testing and experimenting processes while others
were abandoned. The process of accumulating and developing individual knowledge involved a
series of iterations of intuiting, interpreting, and testing for validity or usefulness. In addition to
insight selection, the testing and experimenting processes validate the Green Belt’s insight as
legitimate. This legitimacy makes the Green Belt more confident in moving forward to share the
insight with the group or with someone in formal authority. This is the process that Jack (case 2)
went through when he submitted his idea and requested permission from the continuous
improvement manager to pursue it as a Green Belt project.
Our case data shows that insights that developed individually and that withstood scrutiny
became legitimized and shared with the group even when they contradicted the mental models of
the group. Clyde (Case 1) shared his finding about the lack of relevance of speed and throughput
with his team, even though it contradicted the expert assessment. The performance data he had
collected helped him make this conclusion and facilitated a follow-up conversation about what

94

additional variables could cause the problem. Jack (Case 2) was more confident in sharing his
insight about the improvement opportunity with his team once he had confirmed its authorization
and the size of the financial opportunity.
Finally, the testing and experimenting processes led to stabilization of the insight into
knowledge, which proves useful if the insight is challenged at the group level or if the next
logical insight is found untrue (Case 1). Empirical data shows that, guided by DMAIC, an insight
goes through a process of emergence (intuiting process), interpretation (interpreting process),
and testing for validity (testing process). Depending on how well the insight survives validity
tests, it is either abandoned or stabilized enough to become a foundation for the next stage of the
improvement process, where its legitimacy makes it accepted as knowledge. In cases 3 and 4,
where the Green Belt project leaders worked independently, the DMAIC learning remained
individual (Table 7). In cases 1 and 2, the project leaders and the teams learned from the
successive DMAIC phases, integrating and stabilizing each phase’s learning to build and
implement a robust solution.
Table 7: Green Belt Project Leader Learning
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V.I.i.iii DMAIC toolkit. The DMAIC methodology includes tools within each phase to
prime the intuiting process through activities ranging from observation, qualitative inquiry, and
team brainstorming to more quantitative benchmarking, data displays, or data analysis to reveal
unrecognized patterns. Unexpected, nonrandom patterns in the Measure or Analysis phase
usually indicate a new potential causal link worth investigating. If the insight about that causal
link can be interpreted, explained logically, and verified with data, it is then legitimized,
accepted and incorporated in the project. Because DMAIC requires ongoing documentation,
project leaders make their understanding of these insights explicit through the interpreting
process. Documentation of free-flow brainstorming allows the Green Belt to acknowledge and
document insights that he or she might not yet be able to interpret. As understanding progresses,
so does the interpreting process. Iterations of the required documentation updates allowed us to
trace the feed-forward progression of several insights emerging over time.
V.I.i.iv Parallel meso-structure and learning environment. The iBPI parallel mesostructure that sets Six Sigma apart from other process improvement methods provides an
alternative structure (Schroeder et al., 2008) that allows Green Belts to leverage an alternate
formal structure to obtain the support and resources required to challenge the status quo (Cases 1
and 2) and complete their projects. Further, the training approach and the coaching support of
BBs and MBBs provide a learning environment that promotes enquiry into new ways of
working. When this learning environment extends to the project teams using DMAIC to design
and explore new solutions, it leads to group learning. In cases of organizational learning (cases 1
and 2), the learning environment further extends to include the decision makers.
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V.I.ii Organizational Learning Inhibitors in iBPI
V.I.ii.i DMAIC toolkit and structure. Looking through the lens of the 4I model, DMAIC
emerges as a purposeful, systematic sequence to stimulate intuiting, motivate interpreting and
facilitate integrating. The sequence repeats through each phase and culminates in documenting
performance indicators and process control mechanisms in the Control phase. At that stage, the
Green Belt has learned how to lead an iBPI project through DMAIC, and the team has learned
about the process under improvement. In case the organization decides not to pursue the
recommended action (Case 3) the experience of learning and the documentation remains. In
cases where the solution is implemented (Case 4), the organization reaps the additional benefit of
the tangible improvement. In either case, the DMAIC process is complete. Even when the project
documentation is accessible companywide, there is no further mechanism to facilitate learning or
application at the organizational level. Green Belts return to their full-time, day-to-day
responsibilities, BBs are reallocated to other projects and learning remains at the individual and
group levels.
Project leaders in cases 1 and 2 led beyond the completion of their DMAIC deliverables.
They leveraged the parallel meso-structure (Schroeder et al.,1998) by deliberately focusing on
having their solution institutionalized at the organizational level. This manifested as longer
project cycle times (from 6 to 24 months) and sometimes additional iterations or “three mini
projects.”
V.I.ii.ii Metrics. Through project success metrics such as “project cycle time,” Cases 3
and 4 looked more successful. Through these same lenses, process steps used by project leaders
in cases 1 and 2 looked like they were non value added because they deviated from the familiar
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DMAIC toolkit. The extent of the organizational learning contribution of Cases 1 and 2 through
the institutionalization and the feedback processes were revealed by 4I lenses. The rich structure,
rigor and resource allocation and shared mental models that make DMAIC so successful at
generating individual and group learning is lacking between the group and organizational levels.
In this way, the program design becomes a barrier to organizational learning. The lack of
processes to facilitate the transition to the organizational level and the feedback process of
organizational learning, and the perception that DMAIC is sufficient, cause resources to be
reallocated and stops the learning process. Further, since there is no longer any context for their
continued efforts, project leaders either become invisible (Case 2) or must contend with open
derision of their motives (Case 1). These factors may explain why there are so few examples of
organizational learning originating from frontline iBPI projects.
V.I.iii Discussion. Based on these empirical findings, the role of the frontline iBPI
project leader in organizational learning appears to be more expansive than is currently
prescribed by the DMAIC methodology and more complex than is described by the 4I model.
Consequently, though DMAIC contributes significantly to organizational learning, in its current
configuration, it poses several barriers to frontline project leadership success. The imbalance
caused by an overemphasis on feed forward and a limited feedback flow, make the program very
inefficient. Further, the project scope includes the individual and group levels only, precluding
institutionalization save for some very enterprising and persistent project leaders. Finally, the
productivity mandates for program deployment demand that results be achieved so quickly that
they may jeopardize the learning process necessary for organizational learning. Part-time project
leaders and their teams will be encouraged to “just do,” which ultimately stops the continuous
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improvement loop. In failing to institutionalize a path to organizational learning, we might be
institutionalizing a path to project failure.
Fortunately, the theoretical lenses of the 4I model give us some insight into the frontline
leader’s role in facilitating organizational learning in iBPI. This learning and influencing role at
the organizational level clarifies the role of senior leaders in creating an iBPI project deployment
structure that allows them to do so.
V.II Contribution to the 4I Model of Organizational Learning
The 4I model is positioned to explain how organizations achieve strategic renewal so
they remain competitive despite a changing environment. In this context, organizational actors
must decide which knowledge to develop, which knowledge to acquire, and which knowledge to
use. Like all innovative processes, organizational learning is inefficient and nonlinear, and the
failure rate is high. Organizations are not the only ones facing this trade-off. Individuals do as
well. And while ideas abound and insights arise in an instant, the harder work begins after ideas
and insights are generated. What distinguishes our project leaders is that they are willing to work
hard and stay the course until learning and process improvement results ensue. From studying
their practice of project leadership in iBPI, we derive a stronger theoretical understanding of the
process and the role of project leadership in organizational learning in iBPI .
This study shows that the 4I model of organizational learning describes many of the
salient features of our two success stories, cases1 and 2. In cases of failure, we identify important
differences in execution, such as the lack of group engagement in cases 3 and 4. The contrasts
between successful and unsuccessful examples of organizational learning emphasize the
importance of key premises of the 4I model, such as the flow of learning across all three levels.
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Following the practice of leadership in organizational learning in iBPI yields additional
insights. At the finer level of granularity of our data collection and analysis, the process of
leadership of our first two project leaders includes additional sub-processes not identified in the
4I framework. Using that level of granularity, collected as the projects developed over time, we
analyze the differences in these sub-processes to assess how and how much they affected the
flows and outcomes of the organizational learning process.
Based on these empirical results, the role of the frontline iBPI project leader in
organizational learning appears to be more expansive than currently prescribed by the DMAIC
methodology and more complex than described by the 4I model. To understand the significance
of these differences, we contrast the similarities between the project leadership processes in the
two successful cases of organizational learning with the two remaining cases. The comparative
analysis becomes our basis for developing the role of the frontline leadership process, and for
discussing practical implications for iBPI leaders.
V.II.i Nuancing the 4I Model: Subprocesses
V.II.i.i Feed forward: intuiting and integrating. In addition to finding support for the
original 4I and for the Attending and Experimenting action based learning processes, we find
that expanded applications of existing constructs and new constructs emerged, to explain patterns
of events (Table 8) that existing constructs did not describe. For example, the 4I literature
identifies two ways in which individuals intuit. Crossan et al. (1999) distinguish between the
pattern recognition of experts and the search for new connections, which they describe to be
more entrepreneurial. Throughout the cases, we find instances of expert pattern recognition and
creation of new connections. However, many key project insights emerged when expert pattern
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recognition failed and the experts had to create new connections to reconcile the appearance of
the pattern with the data collected. Because Green Belts lead iBPI projects related to their fulltime jobs, they become familiar with many of the patterns. Over time, they take them for granted.
The DMAIC process tools guide project leaders in identifying expert patterns related to their
projects, in making them explicit by documenting the expected relationships, and in collecting
data to validate these relationships. This is what happened with Clyde’s first insight. He created
his project charter, mapped the flow of the product through the machine, and collected data to
confirm the maintenance pattern he recognized, i.e., that excessive parts failure and downtime in
a piece of equipment were caused by speed settings and/or throughput levels beyond the capacity
of the equipment. However, the performance data showed no relationships among speed,
throughput, and machine downtime, so Clyde sought new connections. The failure of his
expertise revealed a knowledge gap; the next step was to close this gap. The knowledge gap, the
need to move forward with the project, and the tools of DMAIC created a context for new
insights to emerge.
We also elaborate on the current understanding of Attending. We describe Attending as an
action-based learning process initiated by the awareness and the need to resolve a knowledge
gap. We found instances of Attending and Experimenting occurring at the individual level.
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Table 8: 4I Extended Constructs Definition - Individual
4I Constructs
(Individual)
Attending (A)

Intuiting (I-1):

Interpreting (I-2):

4I Literature Says
Active process of information seeking from
the environment Zietsma et al. (2002)
Pre-verbal, subconscious process
Arises through pattern recognition (expert)
or establishing new connections
(entrepreneurial) Crossan et al. (1999)
Explaining through words and or action, of
an insight, or idea to one’s self and other
Crossan et al. (1999)

Testing (I-3)

N/A

Experimenting (E)

Active cognitive process of testing and
developing interpretations. Signals the
transition from individuals to groups
Zietsma et al. (2002)

Stabilizing (I-4)

N/A

iBPI Study Finds
Active process of creating knowledge gaps
and seeking divergent data from the
environment to prompt intuiting, facilitated
by DMAIC
Pre-verbal, subconscious process primed by
attending to DMAIC knowledge gaps
Occurs when experts are forced to establish
new connections to explain a pattern they
do not recognize


Facilitated by DMAIC
Affective component of the evidence-based
evolutionary selection process of insights
by which legitimacy is validated
Active cognitive process of testing and
developing interpretations. Individual or
group level process facilitated by DMAIC
Cognitive component of the evidence-based
evolutionary selection process of insights
by which legitimacy is validated or justified
Process by which insights are integrated
into individual mental models as legitimate
knowledge, facilitated by DMAIC

We introduce Testing, which complements Experimenting in validating and developing
interpretations and screening solutions. While the literature defines Experimenting as a
cognitive, deliberate and mostly rational process, Testing accounts for the affective and
subconscious evaluation processes revealed in our data. We also introduce, Stabilizing which is
the process by which an insight or a solution is integrated into mental models as legitimate
knowledge. The stabilization process matters because it allows project leaders to use the
information as a stable foundation from which to place the next building block of the solution or
from which to formulate the new iteration of the group level interpretation.
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Table 9: 4I Extended Constructs - Individual Level Cross-case

Comparing across cases, we find that Green Belt project leaders from cases 1, 2 and 3
experienced the full sequence of individual learning processes, while the Green Belt from case 4
who reported that “it was almost too fast for me to learn” bypassed the Intuiting and Interpreting
stages. Though experimentation occurred to validate the application of the existing project
protocol, there was little stabilization of the learning. This supports our operational definition
that Attending prompts the intuiting process in the context of a knowledge gap. In case 4, the
solution was given to Jay, “tout cuit dans la bouche” or “fully cooked, ready to eat and delivered
in his mouth” to use the local vernacular. There was still the need to complete the project but no
DMAIC knowledge gaps to close, which enabled him to complete project tasks with speed and
accuracy and with limited learning.
Empirical data from cases 1 through 3 supports the following set of constructs for
individual learning processes (Figure 9). Cases 1, 2 and 3 show examples of intuiting (I-1) and
interpreting (I-2), unlike case 4 since Jay did not go through the intuiting process. Both patterns
are consistent with the 4i model and explain the different outcomes in individual learning.
However the 4I learning processes are not sufficient to explain the difference in organizational
learning between cases 1 and 2 and case 3 (Table 9). This apparent lack of discrimination
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through the 4I lenses suggests that additional processes account for the difference in
organizational learning outcomes. It also suggests that individual learning might be required but
not sufficient to unfold into organizational learning.
Figure 9: 4I Extended Constructs - Individual Level

V.II.i.ii Feed forward: interpreting and integrating. Interpreting (I – 2) and Integrating
(I – 3) are presented as group level learning processes in the original 4I model. Recent 4I
literature is split on the topic. While Crossan et al. (1999) argue that only individuals intuit,
Hansen (2012) observed that both individual and group insights occurred, and Zietsma et al.
(2002) observed instances of intuiting as an individual process that is influenced by the group.
We find support for each one of these propositions. Our case data (Table 10) reveals further
differences between cases successful cases with a full spectrum of group level learning
processes, and failed cases where only Testing, Experimenting and Integrating occurred.
An important feature of the iBPI Green Belt team process is that, by virtue of conducting
project deliverables in meetings designed to facilitate team problem solving and sharing of ideas,
we can observe the “aha! moments”. Clyde (case 1) and Jack (Case 2) reported seeing the
connection between a team member acting as a catalyst by making an observation and causing
the group to intuit out loud, in close temporal proximity. As a result, we propose that intuiting is
both an individual process and a group process.
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As outlined in 5.1.1, the Green Belt project and DMAIC process facilitate attending, intuiting,
interpreting, testing and experimenting, integrating and stabilizing. The group dynamics which
instigated and accelerated the interpreting process in Cases 1 and 2 may also constrain the
sharing of individual intuitions. In case 3, Darren was reluctant to share information until he had
solid and proven findings. As a result of the constrained group dynamics, he engaged the group
and the process owner too late in the iBPI project process.
Events unfold differently at the group level when cognitive maps are shared and
interpretations tested prior to integrating. In cases where these steps were bypassed (case 3 and
4), integration was not stabilized. This pattern parallels the difference in time allocated to engage
the groups during the projects. In cases 1 and 2, the team was an integral part of the problem
solving process, whereas in case 3 and 4 they were brought in at experimenting to pilot a
solution, decreed by the gatekeeper. In these latter cases the project leader solved the problem
independently of the team. The decision saved time or allowed the pilot to move forward despite
the group’s reluctance. As a consequence, project leaders failed to surface preferences or address
legitimate concerns which could derail integration. The group failed to learn, and the feedforward flow was interrupted.
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Table 10: 4I Extended Constructs - Group Level Cross-case

V.II.i.iii Feed forward: integrating and institutionalizing. In the 4I model, Integrating
and Institutionalizing complete the feed forward flow of organizational learning. Crossan et al.
(1999) proposed that institutionalizing is the process by which routinized actions occur. “Tasks
are defined, actions specified, and organizational mechanisms put in place to ensure that certain
actions occur. Institutionalizing is the process of embedding learning that has occurred by
individuals and groups into the organization, and it includes systems, structures, procedures, and
strategy.”(Crossan et al., 1999: 525). We find support for these original 4I learning processes at
the organizational level, with the addition of the Testing and Experimenting, and Stabilizing
learning processes introduced previously. The team developing the solution is learning on behalf
of the organization at the group level in feed forward. They have the opportunity to test and
experiment, and modify the solution prior to or during integration. Groups who must use a
solution once it is standardized, no longer have this opportunity. Should the solution fail to meet
their needs which they evaluate through the testing and evaluating process, they may comply as
long as they have to. It seems that institutionalization has occurred. But change continues. Until
the learning is stabilized and becomes the legitimate default (Pro in case 1), the
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institutionalization process can fail (control loop in case 4). In overt cases the previous solution
can be de-institutionalized to make room for the new one (case 2). When the group has not
learned and shared interpretations are not developed, the solution might not perceived to be
legitimate. However, when institutionalization is mandated, the group may avoid the solution in
a more covert but very resilient way (case 4 control loop deactivated. Twice).
The stabilizing process is important because it sets the stage for a successful feedback
loop. The multiple feed-forward and feedback examples in case 1 and 2 show that the knowledge
was stabilized as it was used over time by individuals and groups who had no contact with the
source of the insight. Over time, new knowledge emerged from these new applications in a
sustained sequence of feed-forward and feedback loops. All three levels of the organization had
learned how to learn (Table 11) and were actively using this capability by the end of the study
period. Stabilization enabled feedback. Application of the knowledge created the context for
developing new knowledge.
Table 11: 4I Extended Constructs - Organizational Level Cross-case

This “learn to learn” dynamic (cases 1 and 2) goes beyond tasks, actions, systems and
procedures. It produces embodiment of the learning at the organizational level. In contrast, we
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can link the failure to institutionalize the solutions in cases 3 and 4 to the missing group learning
processes. We can also link Jay’s failure to engage the group and to sustain the control loop in
case 4, to the failure which was institutionalized by the project he was replicating.
V.II.ii Enhancing the 4I model: leadership roles. Theoretical studies have supported
the current elaboration of the model, with the notable exception of Lawrence et al. (2005), who
integrated the concepts of power and politics into the 4I model as the fuel moving organizational
learning from feed forward to feedback. On the other hand, all the empirical studies have
extended the model, with the notable exception of Crossan and Berdrow (2003), who offer one
of the first empirical validations of the 4I model, with a 10-year retrospective case study of the
transformation of the Canadian Post Corporation. Zietsma et al. (2002) and Hansen (2012) have
contributed empirical evidence of additional process steps in organizational learning.
Similarly, this research study finds support for the four premises of the 4I model, which
helps us understand and analyze the complex phenomena of organizational learning. The three
levels and the 4I processes provide rich and deep insights into the process and the role of
frontline project leadership in organizational learning in incremental business process
improvement. The following contributions result from studying the cases from the perspective of
frontline leaders, thereby distinguishing role dynamics and sub-processes that might be
confounded in a top-down example of organizational learning.
V.II.ii.i Leveraging group and organizational gatekeepers. Figure 10 is a model of the
multilevel process of organizational learning in iBPI from a frontline leadership perspective. It
builds on the display of individual level processes (Figure 99), to show all three levels of the
organization. The model distinguishes group learning processes from individual processes with
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the notable addition of the integrating process (I-3), and the individual learning process of the
group level gatekeeper (GK1). Even though the decision to integrate does not have to be
finalized until integrating (I-3), cases 1 and 2 show that early engagement of the group
gatekeeper and participation in the group learning processes, provides a strong foundation for
advocacy. The arrow demonstrates the link between the intervention of the group gatekeeper
and the flow of group learning.
At the group level (G), we acknowledge the critical role played by group-level
gatekeepers (GK1) who decide for the group. While we agree that the individual level is critical
for organizational learning to happen, we find the individual learning process of the group level
caretaker equally important for learning to move to the group level and stabilize. Failure to
secure that learning early may cause the integration process to fail and ultimately stop the feedforward process.
In iBPI the team learns as team members participate in the problem-solving cycle.
Attending allows the team to look at the process under review through the same lenses as the
project leader. In this context, group-level intuiting supports group-level interpreting. Shared
understanding grows, expectations surface and difference can be addressed before integration
begins. As behaviors begin to adjust in coherent action, group members test and experiment to
validate the functionality and fit of the insight. Insights that fail the functionality test are
abandoned and the learning process returns to testing another insight, if another was under
consideration. Otherwise, the learning process returns to the attending process, where intuiting is
primed with cognitive and visual, social, and analytical process improvement tools. If the root
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cause analysis is correct but the test of fit fails, the team may choose to continue to experiment to
develop a more suitable solution.
Though power could be used to force integration, it is usually beyond the purview of a
frontline project leader. Further, unless all other options were removed, it would require a
sustained use of attention and power that might be difficult to allocate. Fortunately, a learning
orientation in project leadership makes key stakeholders -like the group members and the group
level gatekeeper- co-designers of the solution, rendering the use of power less necessary.
Stabilization matters because integration of learning takes time. Further, a leader can use
hierarchical systems to compel behavior changes, but the changes might be transient. Learning
becomes embodied over time and even desired changes may require a period of transition and
practice before they become habits. When changes become self-sustaining, they no longer
require high levels of maintenance and monitoring from formal authority. Removing these
authority structures too early can jeopardize success and the ability to proceed to the next level of
organizational learning.
V.II.ii.ii Organizational level in OL in iBPI. In our study, we find that the transition to
the organizational level occurs only when an organizational-level gatekeeper (GK2) or process
owner actively sponsors the organizational level integration with an intention to institutionalize.
Since institutionalization requires trading-off resources, and making social, political, and
personal investments, the buy-in of the organizational level gatekeeper is critical. Successful
project leaders acquired this level of support by giving visibility to their project and by
facilitating the personal learning experience of the organizational level gatekeepers.
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Figure 10: The Process of Frontline Leadership in Organizational Learning in iBPI

This organizational-level actor may or may not go through the entire learning cycle at the
same time as the project team. However, over time organizational-level actors follow a similar
individual learning path through the 4I processes (Figure 10). Their decision-making criteria is
more complex since they are responsible for managing company resources as senior leaders.
Their tests of validity and fit include these responsibilities. Gatekeepers must evaluate projects
on their ability to help achieve strategic corporate targets and on the relevance of the insight or
the solution to the entire organization. The decision to sponsor the institutionalization of a new
insight is easier to make when group-level integration has proven stable and successful. When
the solution is relevant to a large portion of the organization and aligned with corporate
objectives, a frontline iBPI project is more likely to be institutionalized.
The individual learning of the gatekeeper includes attending (to the performance gaps or
opportunities), intuiting and interpreting (insights about the relevance and fit of the frontline
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project for institutionalization), and some level of testing and experimenting before a decision to
allocate resources is made (case 2). The experimenting process might occur by proxy (case 1)
with the stabilization of group learning. The confidence in the results will be strengthened further
if additional groups also show positive stabilized learning and sustainable productive change,
thereby confirming the functionality beyond the first group involved in the feed-forward loop.
Once the decision is made to institutionalize, the integration process begins between and
within groups that will in turn decide how well the change works for them. Though employees
may not challenge outright decisions made at the corporate level, forced institutionalization of a
solution that the groups find objectionable may lead to limited compliance and avoidance (case
3). Ultimately, the procedures would remain in place, but over time behaviors would revert to the
previous state and stabilization would fail to occur (case 4). This is significant because the
feedback loop starts with the institutionalized knowledge, but that institutionalized knowledge
may reside in the social structure and the practices of the groups and the individuals, which
might differ from the documented knowledge.
V.II.ii.iii The role of the gatekeepers in connecting the levels of organizational
learning. Stevens and Dimitriadis (2004) have pointed out that one of the limitations of the 4I
model is that it seems to assume that individual and group learning will automatically evolve into
organizational learning. They find that this assumption limits the applicability of the model.
Lawrence et al. (2005) have addressed this gap by integrating power and politics in the 4I as the
social energy that fuels the flow from one 4I process to the other. While we agree with the
premise that organizations are political environments and therefore we must account for power,
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frontline iBPI project leaders do not have the political or hierarchical power to coerce
institutionalization and feedback.
Instead, we find that they must develop solutions that really address a need, can be
readily applied, and become well accepted in order to sustain performance of a change. The
validity of the solution in meeting the needs of a variety of stakeholders and its relevance to the
group or the organization are necessary for institutionalization to succeed. Sponsorship by a
gatekeeper (GK1) at the group level is critical to proceed through testing, experimenting, and
group-level stabilization. It is therefore in the project leaders’ best interest to include gatekeepers
in the team learning and problem-solving process.
The shift to the organizational level will not even begin without the sponsorship of a
gatekeeper (Figure 10, GK2) who must make a decision about allocating scarce resources and
attention between new and existing ideas. Without senior sponsorship, the spread of the idea
might be very limited and the organization loses an opportunity to capture important learning.
The hierarchical distance between frontline leaders and organizational-level gatekeepers make
this necessary connection more difficult. The project leader must find a way to bridge this gap
(case 2) or enlist another advocate of the idea (case 1) to support and promote the visibility and
suitability of the iBPI solution at the organizational level, where it must compete for resources
with top-down mandates and initiatives. The individual learning process of the gatekeeper
enables the move to the organizational level and the sustained, active, and visible sponsorship
necessary to move through successful integration to stabilization of learning. Stabilization of
learning occurs though the legitimization of the solution through testing and experimenting by
groups within the organization (case 1). Their experience provides further evidence of success or
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failure to the gatekeeper, who may continue or discontinue to sponsor utilization. If the
sponsorship is maintained and utilization is high, the new learning becomes the default mode of
operation (case 1).
V.II.ii.iv Leading with a learning orientation. The role of the frontline iBPI project
leader is to deliver improved processes and productivity savings. As cases 1 and 2 demonstrate,
the most effective way to produce these bottom-line results is by leading projects with a learning
orientation. Rather than leading from certainty (case 4) and from knowing (case 3), successful
project leaders led from pursuing their own learning while facilitating the learning processes of
their teams. Further, by facilitating the development of knowledge within the levels of the
organization and by facilitating the transition between the levels, frontline iBPI project leaders
can develop solutions grounded in practice and deployed at the organizational level.
In our study, the context of Lean Six Sigma deployment and DMAIC methodology
provided our Green Belt project leaders with the context to bridge the organizational gaps.
Though all four project leaders followed the DMAIC methodology and earned certification as
Green Belts, our cases show that the two project leaders who succeeded at organizational
learning went far beyond the scope of work of a Green Belt project. They sustained advocacy
and project leadership activities for over a year past the completion of their Green Belt
certification requirements. In fact, they did not even pursue completion of the credentialing
process until prompted and aided by the Black Belt in charge of certification.
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Figure 11: Role of the Frontline iBPI Project Leader in Organizational Learning

Constructed from the combined experience of our Green Belts, our model of leadership
for organizational learning (Figure 11) iBPI, shows the role of the project leader at each level of
the 4I model. The larger perimeter shows the project leader’s sphere of action. Concentrated on
individual and group learning, the project leader’s role includes, learning so they might lead,
leading the learning processes of the team and the group level gatekeeper, and advocating for
institutionalization. The latter occurs through the direct (case 2) or indirect (case 1) learning of
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the organizational gatekeeper (GK2) who will also need evidence of success before committing
organizational resources to the corresponding learning and unlearning processes. The actual
process of institutionalization is outside the sphere of control of the iBPI project leader. But it
can only be achieved through their own efforts to create a foundation of proven success, buy-in
and relevance to the organizational level.
V.II.ii.v Learn, to lead. In the cases that led to organizational learning, project leaders
went through their own discovery and learning process and they facilitated the learning processes
of their teams, as well as the learning process of the gatekeepers or process owners who could
approve and support the integrating process. Finally, they led with a clear vision and intention to
have the solution institutionalized, going beyond their scope of work to obtain organizational
sponsorship.
The project leaders’ learning process became the context in which the leadership of the
project unfolded. Project leaders attended to different stimuli and, as they learned, they brought
their teams along. This exploration set the stage for leading the projects with a collaborative and
inclusive learning orientation. In turn, the teams responded with more insights and more
participation. Project leaders did not teach; they learned with their teams. Teams and project
leaders adapted their roles to accommodate the emerging needs of the solution.
V.II.ii.vi Lead to learn. A key theoretical underpinning of the 4I model and our empirical
results converge. Intuiting and interpreting are at the source of organizational learning. However,
as we have demonstrated, the iBPI project methodology consists of progressive learning loops
designed to elicit the emergence or insights and their development into testable hypotheses. We
have also demonstrated that intuiting can happen at the individual or the group level. For a
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project leader, completing a process improvement initiative means facilitating the learning
process of the team over the course of the project.
Project leaders achieve group level learning by actively engaging in the learning process
with their team and by proactively engaging the group level gatekeepers in the learning process.
Creating and maintaining a learning environment is a key aspect of project leadership that
anticipates several barriers to the deployment of solutions or to organizational learning. This cocreation of knowledge at the team level ensures a level of commitment and a level of ownership
that pave the way for stabilizing knowledge and sustainable change. Inclusion of the group-level
gatekeeper in the learning process paves the way for committed support through integration to
stabilization.
The organizational-level gatekeeper controls the transition to the organizational level.
However, the frontline iBPI project leader can help this gatekeeper attend to the potential
benefits of duplicating the success of the group level throughout the organization. By facilitating
the attending, intuiting, and interpreting processes, the project leader provides a context for
sharing the results accomplished at the group level. This process allows the gatekeeper to
experiment by proxy, prompting their testing of the solution against organizational alternatives.
Recognizing the trade-offs involved, the project leader can identify the insights or
solutions that are relevant to the organization and position them in the context of larger
organizational imperatives. This approach can increase the likelihood of institutionalization.
Should the gatekeeper make the decision to proceed with institutionalization, the project leaders
can also serve as an expert resource to group-level gatekeepers going through the integration
process.
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V.II.ii.vii Attend to learning, intend organizational learning. Only some insights or
iBPI projects will be relevant for institutionalization at the organizational level. Beyond leading
the project to completion and facilitating the learning processes of the team and the gatekeepers,
the project leader also needs to attend to the potential applications of the insights that emerge
from the project. Some insights may not be relevant for institutionalization, but as facilitators of
the learning process, project leaders are close enough to identify and surface that potential.
V.III Summary
Frontline leaders of iBPI programs can contribute to organizational learning by
developing solutions worth institutionalizing and by conducting projects with a learning
orientation. The process of learning ensures better content outcomes and increases the likelihood
of acceptance and utilization of the solution. More than learning how to learn, they learn how to
lead group learning. In a circular fashion, the iBPI methodology guides the Green Belts through
a process of learning, which positions them to lead while learning and in turn generates learners.
Generating learners is an important outcome for any organization committed to continuous
improvement and/or to organizational learning.
Though frontline project leaders do not have the power or authority to institutionalize
learning at the organizational level, they can make a compelling case for their solution and
provide evidence based on feed-forward group-level results. Further, iBPI project leaders can be
instrumental in facilitating learning-oriented feedback loops based on knowledge that is already
institutionalized. To lead either learning flow, Green Belts require the support of leaders with
organizational authority, especially to bridge the gap between group and organizational level.
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The result is a bottom-up solution developed by the team, vetted for the needs, preferences and
specificities of practice and deployed with the power and leverage of top down formal authority.

CONCLUSION
Concluding this engaged scholarship research study, I briefly review the contributions to
the theory and practice of organizational learning in iBPI. Next, I discuss the implications for
the practice of iBPI. Finally, I review the limitations of this study and offer suggestions for future
research.
Most of the articles on the 4I model focus on strategic leaders and how ideas originating
from the top are cascaded down through the organization and institutionalized. This top-down
view follows the hierarchical flow of formal authority and is very consistent with extensions of
the model such as the one made by Lawrence et al. (2005), integrating power into the processes
of the 4I model. This study examined the boundaries of the 4I model when applied to frontline
leaders and the institutionalization of ideas they feed forward to the organization.
We find that the 4I model provided strong guidance in identifying cases to study. Indeed,
they all appeared undifferentiated and equally successful at first glance, because of the
incremental business process improvement measures of success. The 4I model helped us
differentiate among the cases by zeroing in on relevant constructs and providing a multilevel
model to get a 360o view of the organizational learning process.
The nature of the projects on which the frontline leaders worked allowed me to collect a
high level of granularity in the data and to leverage the Six Sigma program infrastructure to map
the sub-processes of the project leadership process. Via field observation, interviews, and
ongoing data collection, I tracked the project leadership process over time. This longitudinal data
and process analysis revealed transient changes and sub-processes, which illustrated how some
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iBPI project leaders facilitated organizational learning while others did not. These sub-processes
extend our understanding of the 4I model when applied to the iBPI frontline leadership process.
My findings confirm the multilevel nature of the 4I model and the dynamic nature of the
renewal in which learning occurs through the tension between feed forward and feedback. I
propose to contribute to the literature on the 4I model by integrating the practice of evidencebased learning and iBPI programs into the 4I model. I extend the model to include the role and
the process of leadership of organizational learning in iBPI for frontline employees.
The role of the frontline leader in iBPI is to facilitate the organizational learning
processes leading to the development and the exploitation of knowledge. Understanding the
process of leadership of iBPI projects clarifies the boundaries of the role. Organizational learning
occurs through learning processes spanning three levels of the organization. These three levels
are connected through the sponsorship of group-level and organizational-level gatekeepers.
These gatekeepers have the formal authority to support or to stop the project and the flow of
learning. The project leader manages the leadership process in the context of his own learning.
This includes the learning of the team and the learning of the gatekeeper to ensure
implementation and stabilization of knowledge through the group level.
VI.I Implications for Business Process Improvement Practitioners
The 4I model positions the feedback process as the process by which the organization
exploits the insights that have been institutionalized. However, we found few instances of
feedback beyond an occasional single loop, rigid replication of solutions. The current process
bypasses the group-level integration process, where the group would have the opportunity to
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adapt the insights to the specificities of their own practices. Instead, the project leader’s
interpretation is implemented with varied levels of success.
Practitioners managing a business process improvement program might consider the
boundary conditions of the effectiveness of their programs. At a program level, if it is important
to actively manage the balance of feed-forward and feedback projects. As we have demonstrated,
both learning flows are much more effective when approached with a learning orientation
facilitated by iBPI frontline project leaders. Since Frontline Green Belt project leaders typically
work on projects only part-time and often have to negotiate time and resources to practice their
Six Sigma skills, it is harder for them to get the ongoing support they need to focus on mastering
the problem-solving skills they learn during training or to spend additional time interpreting or
documenting learning. Acknowledging the contributions that frontline Green Belts can make to
organizational learning and understanding the complexity of the process may prompt some
adjustments, including the following five:


implications for deployment model: institutionalize learning



implications for deployment model: shift project resources to feedback



implications for roles and responsibilities: align objectives with learning



implications for project selection: begin feed forward with feedback in mind



implication for metrics: measure (organizational) learning

VI.I.i Implications for deployment model: institutionalize learning. With these
limitations in mind, in order to improve current practices, it might be necessary to institutionalize
learning in the project leadership process. First, it is necessary to help Green Belts lead with a
learning orientation. Making the ongoing learning process explicit and balancing the technical
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focus with group learning and facilitation practice can jump-start the process of embedding
learning into the practice of iBPI project leadership. Green Belt round tables and systematic
after-project reviews will help Green Belts learn from both successes and failures. Training
Black Belts and Master Black Belts as learning coaches as well as technical subject matter
experts will support this shift from learning how to do, to learning how to learn.
VI.I.ii Implications for deployment model: shift project resources to feedback. With
the ratio of project activities and resources dramatically biased toward exploration and not
actively managed to encourage commensurate exploitation of the knowledge, there may be a
significant opportunity cost. Projects led by frontline Green Belts have the typical abandonment
rate of exploration projects (over 80%) (Bourg et al., 2008) and also typically have a lower
savings target. This low project yield means that in order to deliver overall program target
savings, successful exploration projects must deliver much higher bottom-line results to
compensate for the high failure rate of remaining exploration projects. Shifting focus and
resources primarily to institutionalization and feedback opportunities and secondarily to other
exploitation opportunities would make the overall program more sustainable. Leading feedback
loops with a learning orientation, iBPI project leaders would continue to develop learners but
face fewer roadblocks in generating organizational-level visibility for their projects.
VI.I.iii Implications for roles and responsibilities: Align objectives with learning. To
enable organizational learning from Green Belt projects, Black Belts, Master Black Belts, and
project champions also need to attend to the knowledge gaps from which insights emerge and
partner in the facilitation of the learning processes. Two specific areas of focus would be
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identifying learning that should be institutionalized and helping to bridge the hierarchical gap to
make the case with the organizational gatekeepers.
Black Belts and Master Black Belts can also facilitate the exploitation of knowledge by
providing the social interaction necessary for project leader learning to occur while coaching
with a learning orientation during the feedback loops. While documentation matters, program
managers might consider ensuring that knowledge is coded or embedded in organizational
routines or procedures in a way that facilitates exploitation by improving access and usability.
Finally, organizational learning occurs over time. The incentive to move quickly from
one project to the next can jeopardize the integration or institutionalization of a solution. It is
important to stay the course until stabilization occurs and to measure success accordingly.
VI.I.iv Implications for project selection: Begin feed forward with feedback in mind.
The multilevel evolutionary selection process ensures that only insights or solutions from
projects that have organizational-level relevance will be fed forward to institutionalization. Only
opportunities for replication that promise financial and social payoffs will be worthwhile to the
influencers who engineer integration and institutionalization. Perhaps relevance to multiple
groups and ability to leverage feedback should be one of the primary selection criteria for
frontline projects. Designing solutions around the opportunity to institutionalize would help
provide bridge the gap between the group and organizational level by providing support for
integrating and institutionalizing insights or solutions. This would facilitate a greater exploitation
of organizational knowledge.
VI.I.v Implication for metrics: Measure (organizational) learning. The current
measurement system—focused on speed of completion, savings from the group level project, and
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certification—is painting a skewed picture of the true value added provided by iBPI project
leaders. This measurement system might be a good candidate for organizational unlearning, to
leave room for a measurement that recognizes the organizational learning dimension of success
or the cumulative benefit of knowledge contributions.
VI.I.vi Conclusion: adjustments. In conclusion, iBPI programs have the potential to
contribute significantly to organizational learning. In its current configuration, iBPI poses several
barriers to frontline project leadership success. The imbalance caused by an overemphasis on
feed forward and a limited feedback flow, make the program very inefficient. Further, the project
scope includes the individual and group levels only, precluding institutionalization, save for
some very enterprising and persistent project leaders. Finally, the productivity mandates behind
program deployment demand results so quickly that they may jeopardize the learning process
necessary for organizational learning. Part-time project leaders and their teams will be
encouraged to “just do,” which ultimately stops the continuous improvement loop. In failing to
institutionalize a path to organizational learning, we might be institutionalizing a path to project
failure. While the process develops learners, they may end up learning something unintended.
Fortunately, the theoretical lenses of the 4I model give us some insight into the role of the
frontline leader in facilitating organizational learning in iBPI. This learning and influencing role
at the organizational level sheds some light on the responsibility of the senior leaders in creating
an iBPI project deployment structure that allows frontline leaders to lead for organizational
learning.
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VI.II Limitations
While we have identified the way the DMAIC methodology guides project teams and
sponsors through an explicit and rational evolutionary selection process, we cannot ignore the
realities of power and formal authority in organizations. This is the context within which projects
take place. While we have integrated the impact of formal authority, even a rational allocation of
resources and support and the decision-making processes of key actors are likely to be influenced
by power and by elements extraneous to the project.
VI.II.i Integrating the role of emotions and motivation in organizational learning in
iBPI. Our interviews and field observations reveal the project leadership process to be a very
emotional process. Green Belts describe key events in colorful metaphors and express a wide
range of emotions as they report out on their projects and as they reflect upon their learning. We
bounded this study with the premises of the 4I model. However, the cognition-action loop that is
the fourth premise of the 4I model does not capture this dimension of our data. A model of the
process of leadership in organizational learning will continue to be incomplete so long as it fails
to integrate emotions as one the key motors of learning, decision making, and behavioral change.
Acknowledging the emotion-action-cognition loop and integrating its dynamic into the process
would be a worthwhile extension of this work.
Finally, as learning develops over time, project leaders committed to organizational
learning take on a larger scope of work over a longer period of time. Our empirical results show
that the project leaders who choose to do the hard work of organizational learning follow a
different process and have different motivations. Our empirical results show that they are more
committed to their own vision of success and more motivated to continue until that vision is
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fulfilled. Also that motivation does not match the rationale of self-interest. Indeed, these leaders
may not get the credit for the additional work or the additional benefits from the project. Instead,
they tend to be teased or ridiculed by their peers and looked upon with suspicion by their
managers. Yet, they sustain project activities over the long run, long past the time when they
might have been rewarded by the organization.
VI.II.ii Single-Person coding. Another limitation of this study is that the qualitative
coding of the interview data was conducted by a single researcher. It is possible that multiple
researchers would have coded the interviews differently. To minimize the potential single-person
coding bias, a key informant assisting in the research coded a pilot interview. The same key
informant participated in the subsequent analysis of the research findings.
VI.III Future Research
Case 1 and 2 project leaders are examples of project leaders who have defined their own
roles, their own scope of work, and their own images of success and who seem motivated by
something beyond their own self-interest. Both project leaders understood, recognized, and
leveraged the power and organizational politics of formal leaders to facilitate organizational
learning. Yet, especially in case 1, the behavior of the project leader behavior is inconsistent with
power and politics. These findings supplement further the need to extend our understanding of
leadership for organizational learning beyond the rational model, to explain the role of emotion
and motivation in organizational learning in incremental business process improvement.
This study yielded actionable knowledge about the practice of iBPI project leadership,
which is of immediate strategic relevance to consultants, senior leaders, and iBPI project leaders.
Using an embedded case study allowed me to keep the corporate environment constant across
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cases and focus on the impact of project-level dynamics. A follow-up research study comparing
several organizations would contribute to our understanding of the role of values-based
leadership and corporate ethics in organizational learning in iBPI.
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